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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS A DEVICE
FOR PROTECTING THE INNOCENT
Arnold H. Loewy*

The fourth amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ." 1 The thesis of this Article is that the primary purpose of this provision is to
protect the innocent. By "innocent," I do not mean totally innocent.
(How many of us are?) I mean innocent of the crime charged or not
in possession of the evidence sought. 2
Implicit in this thesis are two interrelated (if not identical) propositions: ( 1) It is not unreasonable for the police to search for and
seize evidence of crime; and (2) there is no fourth amendment right
to secrete such evidence, ie., the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects does not include the right to
be secure from the government's finding evidence of a crime.
If these propositions are correct, why has the Court invalidated
so many searches and seizures that have produced evidence of
crime? In many cases, the answer is that at the time of the search
there was an insufficient probability of finding the evidence to justify
the risk that an innocent person may be subject to the search. In
legal jargon, the Court says that.the police lacked probable cause.3
In other cases, the potential bias of the decisionmaker, be it a policeman4 or an attorney general, 5 has caused the Court to invalidate a
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. B.S. 1961, J.D. 1963,
Boston University; L.L.M. 1964, Harvard - Ed. The author is grateful to Lowell Ball, Robert Port, and especially Frederick S. Barbour, who provided helpful research assistance in the
preparation of this Article.
I. " ... and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. These two groups may not always be analytically identical. Nonsuspects who possess
evidence of a crime arguably should receive more protection than a suspect who possesses such
evidence. Although such a dichotomy was rejected by Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 549
(1978), one might hope that that case may not be the last word on the subject. Cf. The Privacy
Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa to 2000aa-12 (Supp. IV 1980) (generally prohibiting searches of newspaper offices in favor of subpoenas, except where the government demonstrates the likely failure of a subpoena in producing the evidence).
3. E.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969).
4. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 9 (1977)
5. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-50 (1971).
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search or seizure. The Court has reasoned that unless a neutral and
detached magistrate makes the judgment to allow the search or
seizure, there is an unjustifiably high risk that one "engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime"6 will subject an
innocent person to a search or seizure.
Under this theory of the fourth amendment, a guilty person,
lacking the right to secrete evidence, is essentially an incidental beneficiary of a rule designed to benefit somebody else - an innocent
person who is not before the court. 7 Consequently, in construing the
fourth amendment, the Court's primary focus should be on the effect
of its pronouncements on the innocent. In fact, the Court's focus
frequently has -been on the rights of the guilty, though rarely as
flagrantly as in United States v. White 8 where it said: "If the law
gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or
becomes a police agent, neither should it protect him when that same
6. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
7. Although the fourth amendment functions primarily as a device for protecting the inno•
cent, there are a few instances where a search for evidence of crime might be unreasonable. In
these exceptional circumstances, the guilty would be "protected" by the restrictions the fourth
amendment places on official search and seizure.
A major consideration here is the relevance of the evidence sought to the alleged criminal
conduct. For example, if the authorities have probable cause to suspect a law professor of tax
fraud, could a warrant be issued to seize tax casebooks and other academic materials as "evidence" of the professor's capability to defraud? Clearly, a threshold test of relevancy is needed
or too many items would be subject to seizure as evidence of crime. The Court alluded to this
problem in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), in which the Court abandoned the "mere
evidence rule" (see Part I i'![ra), but cautioned that "[t]here must, of course, be a nexus ...
between the item to be seized and criminal behavior." 387 U.S. at 307. See also United States
v. Highfill, 334 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (once the items described in the warrant are
discovered, search must cease). This concept, however, has not been developed in subsequent
opinions.
Another related issue is the type of search necessary to uncover evidence of certain criminal
activities. Searches for documentary evidence, for example, require a broad and thorough
search through nonevidentiary material before the seizable item is found. Such a search offers
no protection for one's privacy interest in the nonevidentiary documents examined. q.
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (search of student newspaper's office for photo•
graphs of demonstrators who had assaulted police upheld); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S.
463, 479-82 (1976) (warrant held sufficiently specific despite presence of phrase authorizing
seizure of "other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown").
A third instance in which the guilty may be shielded by the protections of the fourth
amendment occurs when the method used in obtaining evidence of crime is itself unreasona•
ble. Compare Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (inducing petitioner to regurgitate evidence "shocks the conscience" and violates due process), with Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966) (particular manner and method of warrantless seizure of blood
sample found reasonable).
Finally, the guilty might be "protected" if a search and seizure would implicate first
amendment values. See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (pursuant to a gen•
era! warrant, officers seized more than 2,000 items, including petitioner's books, pamphlets and
papers; constitutional prohibition of warrants that do not describe with particularity the things
to be seized "is to be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude" when the first amendment is
involved). These issues are of course beyond the scope of this Article.
8. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
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agent has recorded or transmitted the conversations which are later
offered in evidence to prove the State's case." 9
Part I of this Article establishes that the government has a right
to search for and seize evidence of crime. Part II develops the corollary proposition that the fourth amendment does not protect the
right to secrete evidence of crime. Part III explores the impact of the
reasonable expectation of privacy concept on the innocent. Part IV
evaluates consent searches and their effect on the innocent. Finally,
Part V considers the exclusionary rule as a device for protecting the
innocent.

I.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS THE RIGHT TO SEARCH FOR AND
SEIZE EVIDENCE OF CRIME

One could establish this premise simply by citing Warden v. Hayden . 10 (Those readers who are satisfied with that can turn to Part IL)
This premise is so important to my thesis, however, that it seems
desirable if not critical to establish the correctness of that decision.
The Court described the search, seizure, and accompanying incidents as follows:
About 8 a.m. on March 17, 1962, an armed robber entered the business premises of the Diamond Cab Company in Baltimore, Maryland.
He took some $363 and ran. Two cab drivers in the vicinity, attracted
by shouts of "holdup," followed the man to 2111 Cocoa Lane. One
Driver notified the company dispatcher by radio that the man was a
Negro about 5'8" tall, wearing a light cap and dark jacket, and that he
had entered the house on Cocoa Lane. The dispatcher relayed the information to the police who were proceeding to the scene of the robbery. Within minutes, police arrived at the house in a number of
patrol cars. An officer knocked and announced their presence. Mrs.
Hayden answered, and the officers told her they believed that a robber
had entered the house, and asked to search the house. She offered no
objection.
The officers spread out through the first and second floors and the
cellar in search of the robber. Hayden was found in an upstairs bedroom feigning sleep. He was arrested when the officers on the first
floor and in the cellar reported that no other man was in the house.
Meanwhile an officer was attracted to an adjoining bathroom by the
noise of running water, and discovered a shotgun and a pistol in a flush
9. 401 U.S. at 752 (emphasis added).
IO. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Although I believe this premise should be obvious to the point of
banality, some Justices (e.g., Douglas in Hayden) and commentators (e.g., White, Some Forgollen Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81 MICH. L. REV. 201 (1983)), maintain that
the government may search for and seize evidence of crime only if it can assert a superior
proprietary interest. In their view, it is the proprietary rather than the evidential character of
the government's interest which justifies the search and seizure.

1232

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 81:1229

tank; another officer who, according to the District Court, ''was searching the cellar for a man or the money" found in a washing machine a
jacket and trousers of the type the fleeing man was said to have worn.
A clip of ammunition for the pistol and a cap were found under the
mattress of Hayden's bed, and ammunition for the shotgun was found
in a bureau drawer in Hayden's room. All these items of evidence
were introduced against respondent at his trial. 11

After holding the search to be justified under "the exigencies of
the situation," 12 the Court turned to Hayden's principal argument
which was that the items of clothing were inadmissible because the
government could assert no proprietary interest in the items seized:
the clothing was neither contraband (which by definition Hayden
had no right to possess); the fruit of a crime (e.g., stolen goods in
which the government acting on behalf of the owner could assert a
superior proprietary interest); or an instrumentality of crime (which
at common law forfeited to the state). 13 Hayden contended that absent any governmental proprietary interest, the government interest
in his clothing was as "mere evidence," and therefore the seizure was
per se unreasonable.
The Court (per Justice Brennan) rejected this argument, describing the need for a proprietary interest as "a fiction, obscuring the
reality that government has an interest in solving crime." 14 Justice
Douglas, on the other hand, was taken by the argument. In a lone
dissent, he argued that the fourth amendment creates "two faces of
privacy:"
(1) One creates a zone of privacy that may not be invaded by the
police through raids, by the legislators through laws, or by magistrates through the issuance of warrants.
(2) A second creates a zone of privacy that may be invaded either by
the police in hot pursuit or by a search incident to arrest or by a
warrant issued by a magistrate on a showing of probable cause. 15

Thus, Justice Douglas squarely aligned himself with the proprietary
argument.
In my view, no reasonable method of constitutional adjudication
supports Justice Douglas' conclusion. To establish this proposition, I
shall analyze the question by examining the relevant constitutional
text, policy, history, and precedent.
11. 387 U.S. at 297-98 (footnotes ommitted).
12. 387 U.S. at 298 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)),
13. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-83 (1974)
(statutory forfeiture scheme compared to co=on law by which the instrumentalities of crimes
were forfeited to the sovereign).
14. 387 U.S. at 306.
15. 387 U.S. at 313 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Text

As is usually the case with expansively worded amendments, the
text alone is not very enlightening. The word "unreasonable," however, is unique in the Bill of Rights, a document otherwise couched
in absolute language. It is only through interpretation that guarantees such as freedom of speech, 16 the right to counsel, 17 the right to a
speedy trial, 18 and freedom from double jeopardy, 19 have been held
to be less than absolute. But the fourth amendment, unlike these
other provisions, implicitly tells us that some searches and seizures
are reasonable.
Perhaps the starkest textual contrast is with the third amendment.
Like the fourth, it protects the right of the people to be secure in
their homes. Unlike the fourth, however, it is absolute (except in
time of war): "No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any
house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law." 20 If Douglas' reading of the fourth
were correct, one might asume that it would have contained a dichotomy similar to the time of peace/time of war dichotomy in the
third. For example, it might have read:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects shall not be violated, and there shall be no searches for nor
seizures of evidence of crime unless the Government claims ownership
of the property which it is seeking, in which case its search must not be
unreasonable, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

I do not suggest that the difference between the actual wording of the
amendment and my suggested pro-Douglas wording is dispositive.
It is always easy to say that if the framers had meant to support a
view with which one disagrees, they would have written the Constitution differently. Nevertheless, the conditional wording of the
fourth amendment, when contrasted to the absolute language of the
rest of the Bill of Rights and partially absolute/partially relative language of the third amendment, militates against the Douglas dissent.
B. Policy

To the extent that policy considerations are relevant in constitu16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

E.g.•
E.g.,
E.g.•
E.g.•
U.S.

Schenck v. United States. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973).
Const. amend. lll.
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tional adjudication,21 there is little to commend the Douglas result.
The importance of solving crime cannot be gainsaid. It is one of the
most critical functions that a government can perform. Indeed, failure to perform that function can do as much if not more to destroy
the people's right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects than the misguided efforts of a few overzealous policemen.
Furthermore, there can be little doubt that an inability to obtain evidence of crime would significantly impede obtaining convictions. 22
Thus, one must conclude that the government's interest in seizing
evidence of crime is nothing short of compelling. 23
Conversely, the government's interest in obtaining instrumentalities of crime is often attenuated. To be sure, at common law, certain
instrumentalities were seizable. An extreme example of this was
sanctioned in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 24 in which
the Court upheld the seizure of a yacht, aboard which a lessee possessed one marijuana cigarette.25 The yacht owner's lack of knowledge or reason to know of the "crime," as well as the provision in the
21. Professor Grey has argued that courts constitutionally apply policy considerations not
articulated in the text of the Constitution in the course of judicial review. According to Professor Grey, the courts have a role as the expounder of basic national ideals of individual liberty
and fair treatment, even when the content of these ideals is not expressly attributable to the
Constitution. See Grey, .Do We Have An Unwrillen Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703
(1975).
Professor Grey's view is not universally shared. At the other end of the spectrum, Justice
Black, Professors Ely and Wechsler, and others, have urged that the key to constitutional adjudication is fidelity to the constitutional text in judicial review. For a strong attack on judicial
consideration of the wisdom of governmental policy, see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 507-27 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); see also, Ely, The Wages of Crying Wo!f: A
Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 949 (1973); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles
of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. I (1959).
22. The Douglas result would create such an inability unless "instrumentalities" were defined to include almost all material associated with criminal activity. See notes 31 & 66 iefra.
23. Professor White appears to contend that taking one's property for the purpose of con•
victing him is not a taking for a public purpose within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
White, supra note 10, at n.21. Rather than accepting this unsupported assertion, I support
Justice Black's precious remarks in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 240-41 (1969)
(Black, J. dissenting):
It is seemingly becoming more and more difficult to gain acceptance for the proposi•
tion that punishment of the guilty is desirable, other things being equal. One commenta•
tor [Professor Amsterdam] . . . thought it necessary to point out that there is a "strong
public interest in convicting the guilty." Indeed the day may soon come when the ever•
cautious law reviews will actually be forced to offer the timid and uncertain contention,
recently suggested satirically, that "crime may be thought socially undesirable, and its
control a 'valid governmental objective' to which the criminal law is 'rationally related.' "
(footnotes omitted). I might add that the fourth amendment's implicit approval of reasonable
searches and seizures is also rationally related to redressing the socially undesirable phenome•
non known as crime.
24. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
25. "[S]o far as we know only one marihuana cigarette was found on the yacht.'' 416 U.S.
at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
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lease forbidding criminal activity by the lessee, were held to be
irrelevant.
Even if one approves of the Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. result, 26 it
strains credulity to suggest that the government's interest in seizing
that "instrumentality of crime" is more compelling (or in fourth
amendment terms, more reasonable) than its interest in seizing Hayden's jacket or other evidence of crime. 27 Yet, were Justice Douglas'
position to prevail, the proverbial twenty bishops could swear that
Hayden's jacket was in the washing machine, and still no magistrate
would be empowered to issue a warrant to search for it; while on the
other side of town, the government could commandeer a yacht for
no better reason than that a lessee over the owner's objection possessed a marijuana cigarette on board.28
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the mere evidence
rule is that by imposing some limit on what can be seized, it will tend
to limit the scope of the search thereby maximizing privacy.29 In his
Hayden dissent Justice Douglas quoted Learned Hand:
[I]t is only fair to observe that the real evil aimed at by the Fourth
Amendment is the search itself, that invasion of a man's privacy which
consists in rummaging about among his effects to secure evidence
against him. If the search is permitted at all, perhaps it does not make
so much difference what is taken away, since the officers will ordinarily
not be interested in what does not incriminate, and there can be no
sound policy in protecting what does. Nevertheless, limitations upon
the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the quest itself . . . .30

Several difficulties inhere in this position. First, the mere evidence rule is an extraordinarily imprecise device for protecting privacy. While precluding the seizure of so innocuous an item as
Hayden's jacket,31 it sometimes permits even books and records to
26. To say the least, there are serious questions about its justice.
27. I assume, of course, that the Court which treated the yacht as an instrumentality of
crime would not accord similar treatment to Hayden's jacket. See notes 31 & 66 iefra.
28. Justice Douglas' dissent in Pearson recognized that reliance on a proprietary theory of
forfeiture could produce anomalous results:
We deal here with trivia where harsh judge-made law should be tempered with justice. I
realize that the ancient law is founded on the fiction that the inanimate object itself is
guilty of wrongdoing. . . . But that traditional forfeiture doctrine cannot at times be reconciled with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.
416 U.S. at 693 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
29. An interest which Justice Douglas has consistently sought to maximize. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 382 U.S. 479 (1965).
30. 387 U.S at 320-21 (quoting United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930)).
31. The argument could be made that Hayden's jacket and other clothing were instrumentalities of crime, for without them the robbery would have been committed in the nude. See,
e.g., United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 950 (1958), in which
the court held that shoes worn by the defendant were instrumentalities because they "would
facilitate a robber's getaway and would not attract as much public attention as a robber fleeing
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be seized as insrtumentalities of crime. 32 Second, as applied to Hayden, the search itself was clearly legitimate. Consequently, the mere
evidence rule would not have narrowed the scope of the search. 33
Finally as Douglas and Hand themselves tell us: "[T]here can be no
sound policy in protecting what does [incriminate]."
C. History
Research has disclosed no direct evidence supporting the proposition that the framers favored or even thought about the mere evidence rule. 34 As Justice Douglas tells us: "The debates concerning
the Bill of Rights did not focus on the precise point with which we
here deal." 35 Virtually every significant prerevolutionary search or
seizure involved a nonspecific or arbitrarily obtained warrant. Such
things as warrants that did not name the person to be searched,36 did
barefooted from the scene of the holdup." 251 F.2d at 4. Such an expansive definition of
instrumentalities would of course swallow the rule. See also note 66 i,ifra.
32. See, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927) (business ledger and bills
for gas, electric, water and telephone seizable as instrumentalities since "they were convenient,
if not in fact necessary, for the keeping of the account [for the illegal business]; and, as they
were so closely related io the business, it is not unreasonable to consider them as used to carry
it on"); United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 913 (2d Cir. 1930) (papers related to illegal transaction subject to seizure as instrumentalities). See generally T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 59-71 (1969). Arguably, personal papers, such as diaries,
may not be seizable with or without the mere evidence rule. See Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391 (1976) (fourth amendment); United States v. Boyette, 299 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1962)
(fifth amendment).
33. Although the rule would not have limited the search in Hayden, conceivably it might
narrow the scope of a search authorized by a warrant. Even there it would not be limited in
any way reasonably related to balancing the right of the innocent person on the one hand and
the need to solve crime on the other.
34. Much of what historical support there is for the mere evidence rule is collected in
White, supra note 10.
35. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 315 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
36. See Money v. Leach, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B. 1765); Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489
(K.B. 1763); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).
These cases arose from the Crown's search for the source of a pamphlet critical of the king,
The North Briton Number 45, published April 23, 1763. A general warrant was issued by Lord
Halifax, the Secretary of State, directing four of his messengers "to make strict and diligent
search for the authors, printers and publishers of a seditious and treasonable paper entitled The
North Briton, No. 45, ... and them, or any of them, having found, to apprehend and seize,
together with their papers." N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 43 (1931). Armed with this general warrant, the messengers exercised their absolute discretion as to whom or what they could search
and seize. Within three days they arrested as many as 49 persons on suspicion. The messengers eventually apprehended the publisher and printer of Number 45 and from them learned
that John Wilkes, a member of Parliament, was the author. Id at 43-44.
Orders were given to apprehend Wilkes under the authority of the general warrant. Upon
examining the warrant, Wilkes declared it to be "a ridiculous warrant against the whole Eng•
lish nation," and refused to obey it. Wilkes was brought before Lord Halifax, while an under•
secretary of state, Wood, supervised the execution of the warrant. At Wilkes' home, the
messengers seized all of his private papers (including his will and pocketbook) after a blacksmith had opened the drawers of Wilkes' cabinets. Id. at 44.
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not precisely describe the items to be seized,37 or that could be issued
on conjecture or suspicion, 38 were foremost in the framers' minds.
Consequently, the amendment provided that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."
Justice Douglas is unquestionably correct in his assertion that the
framers intended to protect against more than improperly issued
warrants. He notes that a proposed amendment which protected
only against improper warrants was rejected in favor of one which
forbade both unreasonable searches and seizures and improperly issued warrants.39 This conclusion, however, only raises the question
of what constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure; it does not
answer it.
To support his two-faced theory of the fourth amendment, Justice Douglas cites the Complaints of the Bostonians40 and a statement made by Patrick Henry during the Bill of Rights debate in
37. See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.
1765).
The Entick case arose out of a warrant issued by Lord Halifax in November 1762 to search
for John Entick, the author of THE MONITOR OR BRITISH FREEHOLDER and seize him along
with his books and papers. Unlike the warrants in the Wilkes cases, see note 36 supra, this
warrant was specific as to the person, but general as to the papers subject to seizure.
After a jury awarded damages in an action for trespass against Halifax's messengers, the
case was brought before the Court of Common Pleas, where Lord Camden presided. In an
opinion that our Supreme Court later called "one of the landmarks of English liberty" (Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886)), Lord Camden found the warrant to be "wholly
illegal and void." 95 Eng. Rep. at 818. See N. LASSON, supra note 36, at 47-48.
38. See, e.g., John Adams' "abstract" of the argument of James Otis in Paxton's Case,
Quincy Mass. Bay Rep. 51 (1761): "Custom-house officers may enter our houses when they
please - we are commanded to permit their entry - their menial servants may enter - may
break Jocks, bars and every thing in their way - and whether they break through malice or
revenge, no man, no court can inquire - bare suspicion without oath is sufficient." M. SMITH,
THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 344 (1978) (quoting Adams in theMassachusells Spy of Apr.
29, 1773).
Otis' argument in Paxton's Case "was perhaps the most prominent event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the oppression of the mother country." Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616,625 (1886). See also M. SMITH,supra, at 7 n.9; N. LASSON,supra note 36,
at 56-61.
39. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 316-17 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The text of
the original House draft of the fourth amendment was: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, s};lall not be violated by warrants issuing without
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and not particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized." I ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (J. Gales ed.
1789).
40. "The Bostonians complained that 'our houses and even our bed chambers are exposed
to be ransacked, our boxes, chests, and trunks broke open, ravaged and plundered by wretches,
whom no prudent man would venture to employ even as menial servants.'" 387 U.S. at 315
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 17761791, at 25 (1955)).
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Virginia. 41 Neither of these sources remotely supports his theory. 42
He does find some support in the following four paragraphs from
Lord Camden's famous Entick v. Carrington opinion:
There is no process against papers in civil causes. It has been often
tried, but never prevailed. Nay, where the adversary has by force or
fraud got possession of your own proper evidence, there is no way to
get it back but by action.
In the criminal law such a proceeding was never heard of; and yet
there were some crimes, such for instance as murder, rape, robbery,
and house-breaking, to say nothing of forgery and perjury, that are
more atrocious than libelling. But our law has provided no papersearch in these cases to help forward the conviction.
Whether this proceedeth from the gentleness of the law towards
criminals, or from a consideration that such a power would be more
pernicious to the innocent than useful to the public, I will not say.
It is very certain, that the 'law obligeth no man to accuse himself;
because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling
upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust;
and it should seem, that search for evidence is disallowed upon the
same principle. There too the innocent would be confounded with the
guilty.43
41. "They may, unless the general government be restrained by a bill of rights, or some
similar restriction, go into your cellars and rooms, and search, ransack, and measure, every
thing you eat, drink, and wear. They ought to be restrained within proper bounds." 387 U.S.
at 316 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 ELLIOTS' DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CoNSTITU•
TION 448-49 (1836)).
42. If anything, the complaint of the Bostonians decries the arbitrariness and unbridled
power associated with the issuance of a writ of assistance. There is no support in this short
passage for Justice Douglas' assertion that the fourth amendment was promulgated to create
certain "personal sanctuaries" into which the law could never reach. Rather, colonial contempt for the writ of assistance was related to the lack of proper safeguards on its issuance and
execution. For example, consider the following excerpt from the January 4, 1762, Boston Gazelle, of an article probably written by James Otis:
IT is granted that upon some occasions, even a british freeholder's house may be
forceably opened; but as this violence is upon a presumption of his having forfeited his
security, it ought never to be done, and it never is done, but in the cases of the most urgent
necessity and importance; and this necessity and importance always is, and always ought
to be determin'd by adequate and proper judges: Shall so tender a point as this is, be left
to the discretion of ANY person, to whomsoever this writ may be given- shall the jealousies and mere imaginations of a custom house officer, as imperious perhaps as injudicious, be counted a sufficient reason for his breaking into a freeman's house. . . .
If one examines the entire statement of Patrick Henry from which Douglas quotes, it is clear
that Henry's statement does not support a dual aspect of the fourth amendment. In the mate•
rial immediately preceding the quotation, Henry states that
In the present Constitution, they are restrained from issuing general warrants to search
suspected places, or seize persons not named, with out evidence of the commission of a
fact, &c. There was certainly some celestial influence governing those who deliberated on
that Constitution; for they have, with the most cautious and enlightened circumspection,
guarded those indefeasible rights which ought ever to be held sacred. . . .
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 448 (1836). This clearly gives an indication of what Henry meant when he demanded that excisemen "ought to be restrained within
proper bounds."
43. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 314 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Entick
v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1073, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765)).
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Justice Douglas then concluded that "Lord Camden decided two
things: (1) that searches for evidence violated the principle against
self-incrimination; and (2) that general warrants were void."44 In
fact, the language of the last quoted paragraph more naturally reads
that both self-incrimination and searches for evidence confound the
innocent with the guilty, rather than that a search for evidence is
itself a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.45
Thus, a fair reading of Lord Camden's opinion suggests that a
search for evidence of crime is forbidden only when there is an unjustifiably high risk that "the innocent would be confounded with
the guilty."46 This reading is supported by the fact that the warrants
at issue permitted search on suspicion, and named no individuals.
Furthermore, the Entick search itself failed to uncover any evidence
of crime. Additionally, both before and after Entick, a seizure of
evidence as incident to a valid arrest was permitted.47 Finally, in
explaining why the warrant to search for and seize stolen goods was
issued, Lord Camden explained that the absence of the precautions
which existed for the stolen goods warrant "is an undeniable argument against the legality of the thing." 48
If my reading of history is correct, it is necessary to rationalize
the two clauses of the fourth amendment. The single theme running
through the entire history of the fourth amendment is arbitrariness. 49
44. 387 U.S. at 314 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
45. T. TAYLOR, supra note 32, at 53. see also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2264 n.4 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) ("This language, it should be noted, . . . states merely that both [the
rule against self-incrimination and the rule against unreasonable searches] whatever they may
proscribe, do so to protect the innocent from cruelty and injustice.").
46. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1073 (1765).
47. Telford Taylor states that
[t]here is little reason to doubt that search of an arrestee's person and premises is as old as
the institution of arrest itself. That there are ver:y few traces of the matter in the early
records is as true as it is natural, given a practice which was taken for granted.
T. TAYLOR, supra note 32, at 28. The court in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
observed that there existed "the right on the part of the Government, always recognized under
English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime." 232 U.S. at 392 (emphasis added). See also
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 230-33 (1973).
48. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1030, 1067 (K.B. 1765):
Observe .•. the caution with which the law proceeds [in the search for stolen goods].
There must be a full charge upon oath of a theft committed. - The owner must swear
that the goods are lodged in such a place. He must attend at the execution of the warrant
to shew them to the officer, who must see that they answer the description. - And, lastly
the owner must abide the event at his peril: for if the goods are not found, he is a trespasser; and the officer being an innocent person, will always be a ready and convenient
witness against him.
49. See, e.g., John Adams' "abstract" of James Otis' argument against the Writ of Assistance in Paxton's Case, Quincy Mass. Bay Rep. 51 (1761):
It appears to me ..• [the writ of assistance is] the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the
most distrustive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of the constitution, that
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Thus, the grand criterion of the fourth amendment is that there shall
be no arbitrary, ie., unreasonable, searches and seizures.so On this
score it did not matter whether the search was unreasonable because
of an improper warrant or otherwise. Indeed, since unreasonable
searches frequently occur without a warrant, it was prudent of the
framers to protect against them.
Because the police frequently claimed to justify their search by
an oppressive warrant, however, the framers especially felt the need
to keep the issuance of warrants within bounds via a separate clause.
Thus the government could not claim that a warrant rendered its
search reasonable unless the necessary criteria were met. As Professor Telford Taylor put it:
The power to search and seize must be kept within reasonable bounds.
Warrants have been used to authorize dangerous and oppressive arrests and searches, and therefore we will confine their issuance in line
with specified requirements, developed for the common-law stolengoods warrant with which we are all familiar and which have never
given any trouble.S 1

Accordingly, the fourth amendment constrains both searches and
seizures and the issuance of warrants.
D. Precedent

On only one occasion, Gou/ed v. United States,s 2 has the Court
invalidated a seizure exclusively on the ground that the items seized
were mere evidence.s3 Relying on Boyd v. United Statess 4 and
ever was found in an English law-book. . . . Every man prompted by revenge, ill humour or wantonness to inspect the inside of his neighbour's house, may get a writ of
assistance; others will ask it from self defense. One arbitrary exertion will provoke another
until society will be involved in tumult and in blood.
M. SMITH, supra note 38, at 552-54 (1978) (quoting Adams in the Massachuse/ls Spy of Apr.
29, 1773).
50. My use of "arbitrary" is broad enough to encompass that which Professor Amsterdam
calls "unjustified" as well as "arbitrary" searches and seizures. See Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. Rev. 349, 411 (1974).
51. T. TAYLOR, supra note 32, at 43-44 (footnote omitted).
52. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
53. C.f. People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 641, 408 P.2d 108, 112, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 784
(1965) (Traynor, C.J.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 908 (1966) ("Although the [mere evidence] rule
was never expressly repudiated, evidence was never suppressed because of it.")
In this regard, United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932), should be examined. In
Lefkowitz, federal agents executing an arrest warrant seized a number of business documents,
utility bills and other matters relating to illegal liquor sales. The Court excluded evidence
because: a) the search was too exploratory and general to be justified as a search incident to
arrest; and b) the items seized were mere evidence of crime. On similar facts, the Court in
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), had held that a business ledger and utility bills
seized incident to a lawful arrest were admissible in evidence as instrumentalities of crime,
In Thayer, Traynor concluded that the mere evidence rule was not the controlling rationale
of Lefkowitz:
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Weeks v. United States 55 the Court found it "clear'' that search
warrants
may not be used as a means of gaining access to a man's house or office
and papers solely for the purpose of making a search to secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding, but
that they may be resorted to only when a primary right to such search
and seizure may be found in the interest which the public or the complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the
possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders
possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it
may be taken. 56

Clearly, Weeks does not support this result. 57 Weeks involved a
search and seizure of personal papers without a warrant and presumably without probable cause. Under those circumstances the Court
said:
The United States Marshal could only have invaded the house of the
accused when armed with a warrant issued as required by the Constitution, upon sworn information and describing with reasonable particularity the thing for which the search was to be made. Instead, he
acted without sanction of law, doubtless prompted by the desire to
bring further proof to the aid of the Government, and under color of
his office undertook to make a seizure of private papers in direct violation of the constitutional prohibition against such action. Under such
circumstances, without sworn information and particular description,
not even an order of court would have justified such procedure, much
less was it within the authority of the United States Marshal to thus
invade the house and privacy of the accused 58

The clear inference is that if the officer had a warrant and probable
cause based on sworn information, the search and seizure would
have been lawful.
The enigmatic Boyd case, on the other hand, does support
The difference [between Marron and Lefkowitz] was that in.Lefkowitz the officers did
not limit themselves to seizing items plainly visible, but made a thorough search of the
drawers, cabinets and waste-baskets. The court suppressed the evidence because the
search was too broad, and because the items seized were mere evidence. The manner in
which Marron v. United States was distinguished, however, hardly served to reinforce the
Gouled rule. In Marron, the court said, the search was reasonable and the items were held
to be instruments of the crime. Since the items seized and the offense charged were almost
precisely the same in both cases, the distinction between the two cases was only the scope
of the search. When the search was so broad as to be exploratory in nature, the mere
evidence rule was resurrected as an alternative (and superfluous) ground for exclusion.
When the search was otherwise reasonable, the same items became instruments of crime.
63 Cal. 2d at 641, 408 P.2d at lll-12, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 783-84.
54. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
55. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
56. 255 U.S. at 309 (citing Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623-24).
57. Indeed, some commentators ignore Weeks entirely when discussing the Gouled rationale. See w. LAFAVE, 2 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.l(b) (1978).
58. 232 U.S. at 393-94.
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Gouled. This once venerable decision has been so thoroughly discredited in recent years,59 that further attack seems like the proverbial beating of a dead horse. Yet an understanding of why Boyd is
at once revered and condemned is helpful to understanding the ultimate demise of the mere evidence rule.
Boyd abounds with grandiose pronouncements. 60 While those of
us who write from ivory towers perhaps should not condemn grandiosity, even the grandest decision must fine-tune its pronouncements
to the facts of the case if it is to remain viable. Boyd did not do this.
Rather, it relied heavily on inapplicable quotations from Entick 61 to
forge the rule that "any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's
. . . private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime
. . . is within the condemnation of that judgement."62 Ironically,
just one year later, a British court clearly rejected such an expansive
reading of Entick, holding that it was designed to combat the evils of
general warrants issued on suspicion.63
Gou!ed, on the other hand, expanded Boyd andEntick to exclude
59. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 471-72 (1976); Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391, 405-09 (1976); Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87-92 & 95 n.2 (1974); Couch
v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1973); T. Taylor, supra note 32, at 52-71.
60. E.g.:
Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the aggravating incidents of
actual search and seizure, yet, as before said, it contains their substance and essence, and
effects their substantial purpose. It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and
least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing
in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for
the security of person or property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the
right as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis.
116 U.S. at 635.
61. See 116 U.S. at 627-29. As the concurring opinion in Boyd notes, the case did not
involve an actual search and seizure; rather, the case turned on the validity of a subpoena-like
process used to procure incriminating evidence. 116 U.S. at 639 (Miller, J., concurring). In
this respect Entick is not at all applicable, as that case developed from a forcible exploratory
search of Entick's home under a general warrant. Therefore, the Court's use of Lord Camden's discussion of the trespass remedy and his consideration of the stolen goods warrant was
clearly not pertinent to the question at hand, except in a very general sense. See also note 45
supra.
62. 116 U.S. at 630.
63. Dillion v. O'Brien, 16 Cox Crim. Cases 245, 251 (1887). Although Dillon upheld a
search incident to valid arrest during which evidence of crime was found, the court did not
limit its holding to search incident situations:
[The] purpose and object [of the seizure and detention of evidentary material is] derived from the interest which the State has in a person guilty (or reasonably believed to be
guilty) of a crime being brought to justice, and in a prosecution, once commenced, being
determined in due course of law.
16 Cox Crim Cases at 249-50.
In finding that Entick v. Carrington did not support the concept of a "mere evidence" rule,
the court reasoned that:
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all mere evidence and not just private papers. 64 Gou/eel's progeny is
even shakier than its ancestry. The Supreme Court has never excluded evidence on the basis of Gou!ed that it would not have otherwise excluded.65 Lower courts have distinguished Gou!ed in ways
more illusory than real. 66 It has never been applied to searches incident to an arrest. 67 At times, the Supreme Court has flatly ignored
The right here claimed is not to take all the plaintiff's papers, but only those which are
evidence of his guilt; and the claim is based, not as in Entick . . . , upon a warrant issued
upon mere suspicion, but upon an allegation of actual guilt, and a lawful apprehension of
the guilty person. If (by the law, as then understood) the right to seize evidences of guilt
in the possession of the person charged was confined to cases of treason and felony, the
judgment would have been rested on that simple ground, the care which was taken to
show that the warrant embraced all papers would have been thrown away, and the whole
of the elaborate judgment of Lord Camden would have been unnecessary. For myself I
am satisfied that, in pronouncing that judgment, Lord Camden had not before his mind
cases of seizure of evidences of guilt upon lawful apprehension, as distinguished from
general warrants to seize all papers.
16 Cox Crim Cases at 251.
64. 255 U.S. at 309. After Hayden abolished the mere evidence rule, it remained possible
that the fifth amendment might protect documents from seizure. This avenue was foreclosed
by Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). Bui cf. note 32 supra.
65. See note 53 supra.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d I, 3-4 (7th Cir 1958) (shoes worn by defendant during commission of robbery found to be instrumentalities and admissible as evidence),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 950 (1958); United States v. Stem, 225 F. Supp. 187, 192 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) (handwritten sheets containing figures on the taxpayer's cost of living were seizable as
instrumentalities since they "played asign!ftcanl role in the commission of the crime alleged"
(tax fraud) (emphasis in orginal)); United States v. Currency in the Total Amount of$2,223.40,
157 F. Supp. 300, 304 (N.D.N.Y. 1957) (money seized in a raid on a gambling establishment
found to be instrumentality because "[a] sufficient amount of cash ... appears to [be] a necessary and closely related implement or facility of the wagering business as transacted here").
67. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. The nonapplicability of the Gou/ed rule to
searches incident to an arrest undercuts the often-used fifth amendment rationale behind the
rule. For example, the Court in Boyd reasoned:
[T]he "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are
almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself,
which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man "in
a criminal case to be a witness against himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search and seizure"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
ll6 U.S. at 633.
If, however, it was the accepted common law practice to use any evidence uncovered during a search incident to a valid arrest, see note 47 supra, then there seems to be no reason why
"mere evidence" uncovered during the execution of a valid search warrant could not be used.
If the fifth amendment's prohibition against self-incrimination was not implicated in the
search incident situation, it would not be implicated in the search warrant situation.
By following Boyd's dicta, the Gou/ed Court further confused "[t]he fact ... that there is
no 'intimate relation' between the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments . . . . '[T]he principles
of the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments are complementary to each other; what the one
covers, the other leaves untouched.'" J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2264 at 383 n.4 (McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961).
Whereas the Fifth Amendment forbids the use of any force whatever to compel a person
to testify or to produce evidence of his wrong, the Fourth permits the use of all the
strength of government to extract from a man's possession things which will convict him
... In short, while the Fifth Amendment shields the person of the individual in unqualified terms, the Fourth Amendment affords no such protection for his possessions or even
his person if he resists the search, but rather, recognizing that possessions may be seized
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it. 68 In short, when Hayden officially buried the Gou/ed rule, it
merely rendered offical what had been the law sub rosa for years.
Thus, by any method of constitutional adjudication, Hayden was
clearly correct in announcing that the government has the right to
search for evidence of crime.
II.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROTECT THE RIGHT
TO SECRETE EVIDENCE OF CRIME

If the fourth amendment permits the government to search for
and seize evidence of crime, it should follow that an individual has
no inherent right to secrete such evidence. Consequently, the fourth
amendment should be understood as a device to separate the wheat
(evidence of crime) from the chaff (that which individuals may possess free from government prying). In a Utopian society, 69 each policeman would be equipped with an evidence-detecting divining rod.
He would walk up and down the streets and whenever the divining
rod detected evidence of crime, it would locate the evidence. First, it
would single out the house, then it would point to the room, then the
drawer, and finally the evidence itself. Thus, all evidence of crime
would be uncovered in the most efficient possible manner, and no
innocent person would be subject to a search. In a real society (such
as ours), the fourth amendment serves as an imperfect divining rod.
Consider the following hypothetical: Principal X of Y High
School, because of a hunch that students A, B, and C each have
marijuana in their respective lockers, opens the lockers with a passkey. InA's locker, he finds marijuana, which is subsequently given
to the police and used to convict A of possession of marijuana, for
which A receives a year's imprisonment. In B's locker he finds a
picture of his (Principal.X's) head attached to the rear end of a horse
with the caption: "X is a Horse's Ass." In C's locker, he finds a
picture of C's mother with the caption: "Mom."
by might seeks to spell out limitations which will strike a fair balance between a man's
privacy in his things and the duty of government to protect all citizens from criminal
conduct.
State v. Bisacci, 45 N.J. 504, 509, 213 A.2d 185, 187-88 (1965).
68. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1960), in which the Court upheld a
warrantless seizure of petitioner's blood, which was later introduced in evidence leading to
petitioner's conviction for driving while intoxicated. This search and seizure was clearly for
the purpose of gathering evidence only.
It should be noted that although Schmerber involved a search incident to arrest, most
courts would require a warrant or other procedural safeguard before sanctioning a bodily intrusion. See, e.g., United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, 429
U.S. 1062 (1977) (upholding trial court order that a bullet be surgically removed from defendant's arm).
69. Ignoring for the moment that nobody commits crime in a Utopia.
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Assuming that these searches were unlawful,70 conventional wisdom suggests thatA's rights were violated more than the others since
only he suffered a criminal conviction by virtue of the search.71 Yet
B's and C's legitimate privacy interests were more seriously intruded
upon. B had a fourth (and probably a first) amendment72 right to
keep his opinion of the principal to himself. His belief that the principal's prying eyes would not see his crude, but arguably cute, caricature is a reasonable one which ought to be protected.73 Similarly,
C's hanging his mother's picture in his locker (though along with
apple pie and the flag, the paradigmatic affirmation of true-blue
American values) could be a source of embarrassment if made
known to the public.
Let us now vary the hypothetical. Assume that instead of searching the three lockers, X decides to confirm his suspicions by having a
marijuana-sniffing dog sniff the three lockers. The dog determines
that marijuana is present in A's locker, but is not present in either
B's or C's locker. X then goes before a magistrate, who issues a
search warrant to search A's locker for marijuana, which of course is
found.
In this situation, neither B nor C has had his fourth amendment
rights violated. Neither's privacy has been invaded. They have not
been compelled to share secrets with others. The government has
learned nothing about them except that they do not possess marijuana. Any interest they may have in keeping the authorities from
learning of their innocence is surely too trivial to protect.
Have A's rights been violated?74 He would of course like to keep
70. In the hypothetical there was no probable cause. Assuming that school officials do not
have a special privilege to search under the doctrine ofin loco parentis, that students enjoy full
fourth amendment protection (cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (holding that the
cruel and unusual punishments clause does not apply to corporal punishment in the public
schools)), and that the principal is considered a state official (making the search state action),
then the search would be unconstitutional. It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the
validity of these assumptions. For a thorough discussion of searches in public schools, see
Buss, 17ze Fourth Amendment and Searches ofStudents in Public Schools, 59 IOWA L. REV. 739
(1974); Gardner, Sn!ffing for Drugs in the Classroom - Perspectives on Fourth Amendment
Scope, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 803 (1980).
71. Cf. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365-67 (1959) (upholding warrantless administrative search because it was not aimed at a criminal prosecution). Although Frank was overruled by Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the overruling opinion emphasized
the potential criminal liability that could result from an administrative search. 387 U.S. at 531.
72. q. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (holding that handbiller's right to anonymity is protected by the first amendment).
73. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the fourth amendment
protects an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy when he enters a public phone
booth, closes the door, and places a private call).
74. Courts have usually, but not always, upheld the constitutionality of random dog-sniffs.
Compare People v. Evans, 65 Cal. App. 3d 924, 134 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1977) (random dog-sniffs
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to himself the evidence of his crime. But his claim is not a powerful
one. Indeed, in this case, an accurate dog75 approaches the hypothetical divining rod by separating the innocent from the guilty.
Many students and colleagues with whom I have discussed the
divining rod theory have objected to it because of its "1984" overtones.76 There is a major difference, however, between "Big
Brother"77 watching everything and government being able to detect
only evidence of crime.
I am not contending that any use of any device that in some ways
resembles a divining rod is per se reasonable. For example, so innocuous a device as a magnetometer cannot distinguish permissible
metals (coins, keys, etc.) from impermissible ones (guns, knives,
etc.).78 Furthermore, most magnetometers, such as the one in the
United States Supreme Court Building, require that innocent people
be herded like cattle and marched single file through the device. On
the other hand, if a device could be invented that accurately detected
weapons and did not disrupt the normal movement of people, there
could be no fourth amendment objection to its use. 79
Nor do I suggest carte blanche use of marijuana-sniffing dogs.
To the extent that the dog is less than perfectly accurate, innocent
people run the risk of being searched. 80 Additionally, the very act of
constitute unreasonable search), with United States v. Race, 529 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1976) (random dog-sniff of baggage in airline warehouse does not constitute a search).
75. Obviously an inaccurate dog would present different problems. See Doe v. Renfrow,
475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1919),mod!fied, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1022 (1981). See note 80 infra.
16. See G. ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1st Am. ed. 1949).
11. Id.
78. Indeed, so innocent a person as the author of this Article was compelled to empty from
his pockets metal-framed glasses, coins and keys in full view of his students after activating the
magnetometer at the United States Supreme Court.
79. This is not to say the use of a magnetometer is impermissible; rather, that it is only
permissible when the interest in using it outweighs the offensiveness of the instrusion involved.
Those that object to the use of a magnetometer point out that there is a substantial intrusion
because they are herded like cattle through the chute. In United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d
799, 806 (2d Cir. 1974), it was held that the use of a magnetometer in the airport boarding
procedure constituted a search but was reasonable under the circumstances given the minimal
intrusion and the serious danger of airline hijacking. In People v. Hyde, 12 Cal. 3d 158, 16566, 524 P.2d 830, 834-35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 358, 362-63 (1974), the predeparture screening was
justified by analogy to administrative searches. The search of one attempting to board a plane
in United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973), was justified on the theory that the
search was a condition to boarding that did not unreasonably burden the right to travel, and
therefore, by presenting himself at the boarding gate the passenger essentially consented to the
search. For an excellent analysis of the Davis-type rationale, see Andrews, Screening Travelers
at the Airport to Prevent Hijacking: A New Challenge far the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 657 (1974). See also Abramovsky, The Constitutionality of the AnllH(jacking Security System, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 123 (1973).
80. For example, in Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ind. 1979), a drug-sniffing
dog had "alerted" to a 13-year-old junior high school girl during a school-wide "sniff" of all
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being subjected to a body sniff by a German Shepherd may be offensive at best or harrowing at worst to the innocent sniffee. 81
Another concern expressed about marijuana-sniffing dogs (and
presumably other divining rods) is Professor Gardner's contention
that·people have a right to be free from unwarranted suspicion. 82
Thus, in our hypothetical locker search, A, B, and C could all argue
that they had the right to be free from unwarranted suspicion. B and
C, however, were benefited by the dog (divining rod) because it was
the dog that freed them from the unwarranted suspicion which
otherwise would have continued in the principal's mind. 83
Student A might have an argument that he, along with students
B and C: was singled out for special treatment. If he could introduce additional factors, for example, that half of the students were
believed to have marijuana in their lockers and that A, B, and C
were the only blacks in an otherwise all-white school, he might have
a serious constitutional contention. 84 Apart from this equal protection problem, however, there is no constitutional basis for holding
that a person has a right to be free from unjustifiable suspicion. 85
the students. The dog continued to "alert" to her even after she emptied her pockets. Diane
Doe was then subjected to a nude search by two women who examined her clothing and lifted
her hair to look for drugs. No drugs were found but it was later discovered that she had been
playing that morning with her dog, which was in heat. 475 F. Supp. at 1017.
To further highlight the inaccuracy of these particular dogs, they "alerted" to some fifty
students, only seventeen of whom were found to be in possession of drugs. 475 F. Supp. at
1017.
81. In Doe Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. at 1017, the Highland Town School District Board,
the Superintendent of Schools (Omer Renfrow), members of the Highland Police Department
and Patricia Little (owner of a dog training school) devised a plan to combat what they feared
was a growing drug problem in the Highland Junior and Senior High Schools wherein all
2,780 students were required to remain seated at their desks while a dog sniffed at them as the
dog and his trainer walked up and down the aisles. 475 F. Supp. at 1015-17. Thus approximately 2,763 innocent students were subjected to this potentially frightening and definitely
degrading experience, and some 33 students were wrongly suspected of possessing contraband
by the dogs' false alerts.
82. Gardner, supra note 70, at 844-47.
83. See text at notes 133-35 in.fra. Cf. Florida v. Royer, 51 U.S.L.W. 4293, 4297 (U.S. Mar.
23, 1983) (Plurality opinion per White, J.):
If it [a dog sni.ll] had been used, Royer and his luggage could have been momentarily
detained while this investigative procedure was carried out. Indeed, it may be that no
detention at all would have been necessary. A negative result would have freed Royer in
short order; a positive result would have resulted in his justifiable arrest on probable
cause.
84. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
85. Gardner cites no authority to support a constitutional basis for "the right to be free
from unjust suspicion." Furthermore, if there were such a rule, neither the principal nor the
police could ask questions about students suspected of criminal activity as long as there were
no probable cause (or at least no reasonable suspicion) for arrest or search. The result would
be a catch-22 in which police could not search because they did not have probable cause and
could not investigate in order to establish probable cause because suspicion would thereby be
cast on the individual unjustly.
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Indeed, as noted, the beauty of the canine sniff is the ability to free
one from unjustifiable suspicion. 86
In sum, the fourth amendment exists to protect the innocent and
may normally be invoked by the guilty only when necessary to protect the innocent.

Ill.

REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY

AND THE INNOCENT

Unless the government's method of seeking or obtaining evidence
contravenes a reasonable expectation of privacy, the usual requirements of probable cause and a warrant are unnecessary because
there is no search or seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. 87 So long as reasonable expectation of privacy means
86. A final objection to the divining rod theory is that ifwe had a device that would detect
evidence of crimes whenever it existed, it would possibly precipitate enforcement of laws that
we do not really want enforced. The following quote by Thurman W. Arnold expresses the
idea sharply: "Most unenforced criminal laws survive in order to satisfy moral objections to
established modes of conduct. They are unenforced because we want to continue our conduct,
and unrepealed because we want to preserve our morals." Arnold, Law E,!forcemenl - An
Allempl al Social Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. I, 14 (1932). Arguably certain drug laws (e.g.,
possession of marijuana) are examples of such laws. If so, the better course of action is for the
legislatures and perhaps the courts to rethink the propriety of marijuana laws. If the employment of crime-detecting devices such as marijuana-sniffing dogs causes us to rethink that
which we outlaw, it is an argument in favor of, and not against, such a use.
Certain states have already reconsidered their drug laws with respect to marijuana. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT.§ 17.12.IO0(e) (1975) (public possession of one ounce or less of marijuana
or private possession of any amount for personal use punishable by civil fine not to exceed
$100); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383 (1980) (possession ofa usable amount of marijuana
is a civil violation punishable by fine not to exceed $200). The private possession of marijuana
in Alaska was held to be protected (and thus legal) by that state's constitutional guarantee of
privacy in Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975). For a review of state marijuana legisla•
tion, see Bonnie, Decriminalizing the Marijuana User: A Drafter's Guide, 11 U. MICH, J. L.
REF. 3 (1977).
Professor White argues in response to my thesis:
Many of those most vociferously opposed to the writs of assistance were guilty of system•
atic violations of the customs laws; for them and their friends the objection to those writs
was not that they interfered with the rights of innocent people, but that they permitted the
enforcement of certain laws they regarded as evil.
White, supra note 10, star note. Surely this does not establish that the fourth amendment was
adopted to protect those who break unjust laws. If that were the intent, an amendment which
forbids any unreasonable searches rather than all searches seems like an extraordinarily imprecise implementing device. At most, Professor White's evidence suggests that some supporters of the fourth amendment who had engaged in criminal activity hoped to be incidental
beneficiaries of a rule not designed for their benefit. See text at note 7 supra.
87. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), the court held that the warrantless
bugging of a public telephone booth to overhear petitioner's conversations was a fourth
amendment violation;
[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people - and not simply
"area" - against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reacli of
that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into
any given enclosure . . . . The Government's activities in electronically listening to and
recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
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that expectation which should be accorded to an innocent person, it
is consistent with the proposed thesis. Unfortunately, such has not
always been the case. 88
Although the Court did not use these precise words, the result
and much of the rationale of Lewis v. United States 89 paradigmatically illustrates the reasonable expection of privacy theory protecting
the innocent. A government agent telephoned Lewis, falsely represented his identity, and told Lewis that a mutual friend suggested
that Lewis would supply the caller with marijuana. Pursuant to this
representation, Lewis invited the caller to his home to purchase marijuana. Lewis was prosecuted for selling marijuana from his home
to the government agent.
Had the agent engaged in conduct which was likely to induce an
otherwise innocent person to sell marijuana, Lewis could have raised
the defense of entrapment.90 Instead the agent merely gave a predisposed marijuana peddler the opportunity to sell his wares. The
In attempting to flesh out what the majority meant by ''.justifiable reliance," Justice Harlan,
concurring, formulated what came to be considered the Katz rule: "My understanding of the
rule that has emerged from prior decision is that there is a two fold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan,
J., concurring). (See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 91 (1968) (stating that the Katz rule protects reasonable "expectation[s] of privacy"). For a critique of the Court's post-Katz formulations and applications of the Katz rule, see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. Rev. 349, 383-86 (1974).
In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 n.5 (1979), however, the Court noted that it
might not require even a subjective expectation of privacy in certain circumstances:
For example, if the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that
all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might
not in fact entertain any actual expectation of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and
effects. . . . In such circumstances, where an individual's subjective expectations had
been "conditioned" by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms,
those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining
what the scope of fourth amendment protection was.
422 U.S. at 740 n.5.
There have been several cases in which the Court has found no fourth amendment violation because there was no legitimate expectation of privacy. See, e.g., United States v. Mara,
410 U.S. 19 (1973) (compelled production of handwriting exemplars upheld: no reasonable
expectation of privacy exists in the physical characteristics of one's handwriting); United States
v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (compelled production of voice exemplars for identification
purposes upheld). For a general exposition of the Katz rule, see I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE§ 2.1 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
88. See text accompanying notes 104-27 infra.
89. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
90. At least if Lewis were not predisposed to sell marijuana. Under the subjective approach
to entrapment, if the defendant himself was predisposed to commit the crime, there is no entrapment. The Supreme Court has endorsed the subjective approach for federal criminal uses.
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433-35 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,
451 (1932). Under the alternative objective approach, if the government's conduct were such
as to entice an otherwise law-abiding hypothetical individual to commit a crime, the defense is
available regardless of the defendant's actual predisposition. Thus, the subjective approach
focuses on the particular defendant's state of mind while the objective approach looks to the
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agent's role was analogous to a marijuana-sniffing dog. 91 Both the
dog and the agent could learn only that the object of their interest
did or did not have marijuana. 92 The agent in Lewis was more likely
than the dog to find a false negative, i.e., he may have found Lewis
or someone like him who possessed and sold marijuana to be unwilling to deal with him. 93 He could not, however, have found a false
positive, i.e., a nonpossessor of marijuana who would have extended
an invitation to purchase. 94 Consequently, the government's procedure in Lewis presents no risk to the innocent and was rightly
sustained.95
Somewhat more difficult is Lewis' companion case, Hoffa v.
United States ,96 which upheld a conviction based on testimony by a
government informer who, through his friendship with Hoffa, was
able to spend several days in his company and testify to Hoffa's incriminating statements uttered in the informer's presence. 97 The
Court rejected Hoffa's fourth amendment claim, holding that "[t]he
risk of being overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is
probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind
of risk we necessarily assume whenever we speak." 98
Unlike Lewis, the innocent person in the Hoffa situation does run
specific government conduct involved. See generally Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60
MINN. L. REV. 163, 171-84 (1976).
91. See Part II supra.
92. One could argue that an agent is more intrusive than a dog, in that the agent may
witness the suspect in activities other than drug sales, whereas the dog is only cognizant of the
presence of drugs. This does not present a significant threat to the innocent. See text at notes
96- 102 i,!fra.
93. A narcotics pusher might be unwilling to deal with a new or unfamiliar customer out of
caution or fear of just such an undercover operation.
94. Unless, of course, the dealer intended to "sting" the customer by taking his money and
delivering fake goods.
95. That is not to suggest, however, that any further search or unlawful conduct by an
officer would be appropriate. Cf. Gouled v. United States, 25S U.S. 298, 30S-06 (1921) (an
unreasonable search and seizure is committed when a representative of the government "by
stealth, or through social acquaintance, or in the guise of a business call," gains entrance to the
house or office of a person suspected of a crime, and searches without consent).
96. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
97. There was a question raised over whether the informer actually was a government
planted agent or whether he was a private citizen acting on his own behalf. The district court
found that he was not a government agent. See 38S U.S. at 299, n.4. The Supreme Court
proceeded on the assumption that he was planted by the government. 38S U.S. at 299.
The controversy sprang from the fact that Partin had been released on bail from prison and
criminal proceedings against him had been postponed while he served as an informer. Furthermore, after Hoffa's conviction, the charges against Partin were dropped and his wife received four payments of $300. 385 U.S. at 297-98.
98. 38S U.S. at 303 (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
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some risk. Any innocent statement he makes may be reported to the
police chief whether he wants the chief to hear it or not; e.g.: (1)
"The police chief is a horse's ass"; (2) "I'm a Communist sympathizer";99 or (3) "I hope the Yankees win the pennant." 100 Yet the
Court was surely correct in holding that one must run the risk that
any person will repeat any statement to whomever he chooses. The
question is whether he must also run the risk that the person has
been planted by the government. Since a person can choose his confidants and knows that he is risking unauthorized repetition of his
statements, the additional risk to an innocent person that he might
be dealing with a government agent does not seem very great. 101
When this minimal additional risk is balanced against the need for
informants to help solve crime, 102 the Hoffa result seems
defensible. 103
99. The decisions of the Supreme Court make it clear that simple association with the
Communist Party without sharing its unlawful aims or without active advocacy of them is
protected by the first amendment. See, e.g., Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Noto v.
United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
100. From my perspective, the last of these statements is especially repulsive. Probably,
most people also would prefer not to have the first two reported to the police.
101. There are three considerations that minimize this additional risk. First, the informant
is unlikely to report nonincriminating statements to the police. He is, after all, employed only
to provide evidence of crime. Second, the informant's words are not completely reliable. If
the informant tells the police chief that the innocent suspect thinks he is a horse's ass, the
innocent suspect can deny that he ever made the statement. Finally, the only additional risk
that Hoffa imposes on an innocent person is that he may not know the identity of his confidant's employer. The innocent person knows that he is speaking to another person. He knows
that that person may repeat his words to others. All that he does not know is that the person's
employer is the police, rather than, for example, IBM. This additional risk is not sufficiently
great to justify denying police access to information about crime.
102. The court has recognized the key role that informants play in modem crime detection.
For example, in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), the Court upheld an Illinois procedure that allowed the police in a preliminary hearing to establish probable cause for arrest and
search, to withhold the identity and address of their informant so long as they disclosed information tending to show the basis for the informant's knowledge and the informant's record or
reliability.
The Court noted:
A genuine privilege, . . . must be recognized for the identity ofpersons supplying ~he government with information concerning the commission of crimes. Communications of this
kind ought to receive encouragement. They are discouraged if the informer's identity is
disclosed. . . . [An informer] will usually condition his cooperation on an assurance of
anonymity - to protect himself and his family from harm, to preclude adverse social
reactions and to avoid the risk of defamation or malicious prosecution actions against
him. The government also has an interest in non-disclosure of the identity of its informers. Law enforcement officers often depend upon professional informers to furnish them
with a flow of information about criminal activities. Revelation of the dual role played by
such persons ends their usefulness to the government and discourages others from entering into a like relationship.
386 U.S. at 308-09 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, Ev1DENCE § 2374 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)).
103. Other commentators reach the opposite result, arguing that people should not have to
assume the risk that their friends are actually government agents who have promised to report
back to the police. See, e.g., Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amend-
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Although focusing on the interest of the guilty rather than the
innocent did not create a bad result in Lewis and probably did not in
Hoffa, it certainly did in United States v. White,w 4 in which the
Court sanctioned an unwarranted police installation of a transmitting device hidden upon the person of a police informant. The device instantaneously transmitted White's statements, intended only
for the informant's ears, to the police. Recordings of these statements formed part of the government's case against White.
After citing Hoffa and Lewis with approval, the Court analyzed
the problem strictly in terms of a wrongdoer's risk:
If the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither should it protect him when
that same agent has recorded or transmitted the conversations which
are later offered in evidence to prove the State's case. See Lopez v.
United States 373 U.S. 427 (1963).!05 • • •
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk
that his companions may be reporting to the police. If he sufficiently
doubts their trustworthiness, the association will very probably end or
never materialize. But if he has no doubts, or allays them, or risks
what doubt he has, the risk is his. In terms of what his course will be,
what he will or will not do or say, we are unpersuaded that he would
distinguish between probable informers on the one hand and probable
informers with transmitters on the other. . . . An electronic recording
will many times produce a more reliable rendition of what a defendant
has said than will the unaided memory of a police agent. It may also
be that with the recording in existence it is less likely that the informant will change his mind, less chance that threat or injury will suppress
unfavorable evidence and less chance that cross-examination will confound the testimony. Considerations like these obviously do not favor
the defendant, but we are not prepared to hold that a defendant who
has no constitutional right to exclude the informer's unaided testimony
nevertheless has a Fourth Amendment privilege against a more accurate version of the events in question.1° 6

From this perspective, the Court's logic is impeccable. A guilty person has no legitimate interest in a less reliable version of the facts.
Furthermore, a recording reduces the probability of erroneous informant testimony being believed, thus ensuring a more accurate
verdict. 107 Indeed, if one's focus is on the rights of the criminal, it is
ment, 1968 SuP. CT. REV. 133, 151-52. Another commentator argues that Hoffa totally "disregard[s] ... the value of friendship as an aspect of privacy." Note, 76 YALE L.J. 994, 1013
(1967).
104. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
105. (This footnote is the author's.) Lopez involved a situation in which an informant
carried a pocket tape recorder under his clothing and recorded his conversation with the
defendant.
106. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752-53 (1963).
107. For example, under the circumstances in Hojfa, text accompanying notes 96-98 supra,
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hard to accept Hoffa and reject White. 108
As applied to the innocent, however, the risk is entirely different.
Viewing myself as a hypothetical innocent person, it is one thing for
a third party to tell the police chief that I think he is a horse's ass or
that I said I am a Communist sympathizer. 109 It is quite another for
the police chief to hear it from my own mouth. 110 Furthermore, if
the police have an unauthorized recording of my voice, they have the
ability to use it for parlor games, practical jokes, or harassment. 111
The justification for this intrusion upon the innocent is miniscule.
In recent cases in which the Supreme Court has been asked to approve electronic recording or transmitting by a government agent,
the government appears to have had probable cause, 112 but not a
search warrant. 113 Given the intrusiveness of an electronic recording
or transmitting device, it is hard to make a case for dispensing with
probable cause. 114 The usual rationale for requiring a warrant is the
unjustifiably high risk that those "engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime" 115 will assume probable cause
where none exists. Consequently, the fourth amendment contemplates a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. 116 The
there probably is a greater than average possibility that Partin was lying. Therefore, if Hoffa
were indeed innocent, a recording makes it less likely that he might be wrongfully brought to
trial. On the other hand, if Hoffa were in fact guilty, the recording would be more accurate
and reliable and probably would weigh more heavily with the jury than would Partin's testimony. See 385 U.S. at 317-21 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
108. Chief Justice Warren, concurring in the result of Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,
441 (1963), advocated permitting the use of hidden electronic devices by field agents for interagency purpose - such as protecting the credibility of an IRS agent against charges of bribery
- while prohibiting use of such recordings as evidence in criminal trials. 373 U.S. at 445-46.
Chief Justice Warren's proposal is unacceptable because it would preclude the use of valuable
evidence that was lawfully, not unlawfully, obtained. Only by accepting the Warren view
could one focusing on the rights of the criminal accept Hojfa and reject White.
109. In case any police chiefs are reading this Article, please understand these statements
are purely hypothetical.
110. Coming from my own mouth, the impact of the words may be greater; at the very
least, I cannot deny that I made the statements.
111. I assume that it will be impossible to control unauthorized use of these recordings.
Given that they were obtained without a warrant, and suspects have no idea that the tapes
exist, adequate controls seem unlikely. For one example of uncontrolled clandestine surveillance, see D. GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (1981).
112. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S.
323 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963); note 117 i'!fra.
I 13. Of the recent cases cited in note I 12supra, only Osborn involved a situation in which
the police did obtain a warrant before using electronic surveilance.
114. The Supreme Court decisions have done just that. After White, the police could bug
an informant sent by the police to talk to me - the hypothetically innocent person - and
could record or listen in on that conversation.
115. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
116. 333 U.S. at 14. The Court has reached some interesting results in trying to identify
exactly who qualifies as a "neutral and detached" magistrate. Compare Shadwick v. City of
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decision to transmit or record is seldom made instantaneously.
Rather, it is usually the product of much deliberation. 117 Therefore,
it seems hard to justify the absence of a warrant in cases such as
White.us
If the suggestions proposed in this Article had been the law when
the government sought to transmit and record White's conversations,
transmission and recording could have been permissible. The government could have presented its case to a magistrate who would
have issued a warrant for the recording. Meanwhile, any of the rest
of us could have expressed an opinion of the police chief, secure in
the knowledge that his agent was not then and there recording or
transmitting it.
No case illustrates the lack of concern for the innocent better
than Smith v. Maryland, 119 in which the Court held that the installaTampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972) (appointed municipal court clerk is neutral and detached), wit/1
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (state attorney general is not sufficiently
neutral and detached).
117. For example, White involved a series of at least eight prearranged meetings, between
the informant and defendant during a two-month period, for the purpose of purchasing and
selling illegal drugs. Before each scheduled encounter, police agents, without a warrant,
equipped the informant with a hidden microphone and transmitter. See United States v.
White, 405 F.2d 838, 840-42 (7th Cir. 1969) (recitation of facts by Court of Appeals), In fact,
the Court of Appeals specifically noted that "the Government did not argue that the evidence
would have been lost due to the delay of obtaining a warrant, nor do the facts suggest that such
an argument could have been made." 405 F.2d at 844 n.6.
In Lopez, the defendant innkeeper was convicted of attempting to bribe an IRS agent who
was investigating possible evasion of a cabaret tax. After a series of preliminary meetings,
Lopez offered the agent $420 cash plus indefinite future benefits to drop the investigation.
Another meeting was then scheduled for three days later. After the agent reported the attempted bribe and turned over the money to his superiors, he was equipped with both a tape
recorder and a transmitter before the next meeting at which further bribery payments were
made. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 428-32 (1963). Here again, no warrant for the
bugging was obtained despite the fact that the IRS agents had three days' prior notice of the
meeting.
Osborn involved a conviction of Jimmy Hoffa's attorney for attempted jury tampering. In
that case, informant Robert Vick met several times with federal agents, indicated he intended
to apply for a job with Hoffa's attorney, and agreed to report any illegal activities'he observed.
Vick then got a job investigating the backgrounds of potential jurors in the Hoffa case. After
the attorney discovered that Vick's cousin was in the jury pool, preliminary discussions about a
bribe were held. Only then did Vick tell federal agents. In this case, unlike While and Lopez,
the agents did obtain a warrant before concealing a tape recorder on Vick to record further
discussions of the possible bribe. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 325-29 (1966).
118. At one time, it might have been doubtful that a warrant would have been issued for
electronic surveillance, but that is no longer true. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967) (recognizing that agents might well have had probable cause to eavesdrop, but reversing
conviction because no prior warrant obtained); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967)
(invalidating as overbroad a New York statute providing for sweeping warrants to eavesdrop,
but recognizing that "this Court has in the past, under specific conditions and circumstances,
sustained the use of eavesdropping devices"); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966)
(upholding electronic surveillance when carried out pursuant to narrowly drawn warrant).
119. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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tion of a pen register 120 on an individual's telephone was not a
search within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Consequently,
government officials are perfectly free to learn every telephone
number that any persons dials, subject only to the cooperation of the
telephone company.121
Three Justices - Stewart, Marshall, and Brennan - dissented
because of the intolerable impact of this practice on the innocent. 122
Justice Stewart (whose unfortunate majority vote in White helped
establish the underpinning for Smith) noted:
Most private telephone subscribers may have their own numbers listed
in a publicly distributed directory, but I doubt there are any who
would be happy to have broadcast to the world a list of the local or
long distance numbers they have called. This is not because such a list
might in some sense be incriminating, but because it easily could reveal
the identities of the persons and the places called, and thus reveal the
most intimate details of a person's life. 123

Even more pointedly, Justice Marshall observed:
Privacy in placing calls is of value not only to those engaged in crimi120. "A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on a telephone
by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the telephone is released. It
does not overhear oral communications and does not indicate whether calls are actually completed." United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.l (1977). See generally
Claerhout, The Pen Register, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 108 (1970); Note, The Legal Constraints upon
the Use of the Pen Register as a Law E,iforcement Tool, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1028 (1975).
121. The telephone company probably can be compelled to cooperate. q. United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), in which the Court upheld the subpoena of microfilm records held
by defendant's bank. Defendant was convicted on various charges relating to the operation of
an illegal still. In upholding the conviction, the court held that an individual has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in records of his financial transactions kept by a bank as required by
federal law:
Even if we direct our attention to the original checks and deposit slips, rather than to the
microfilm copies actually viewed and obtained by means of the subpoena, we perceive no
legitimate "expectation of privacy" in their contents. The checks are not confidential
communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions. All of
the documents obtained ... contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks
and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business. . . . The depositor
takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by
that person to the Government.
'425 U.S. at 442-43 (citation omitted).
The M11ler decision rested heavily on the court's prior decision in California Bankers Assn.
v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). In Shultz the Court held that the recordkeeping and reporting
requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970), constituted a valid exercise of the power of Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce
and did not violate the fourth amendment rights of the banks. At that time, however, the
Court refused to rule on whether the fourth amendment rights of individual depositors were
abridged because none of the individual plaintiffs in that case had standing. 416 U.S. at 59-70.
Taken together, Miller and Shultz make it clear that the federal government can, on the
one hand, compel the maintenance of business records by banks and, on the other hand, avoid
any fourth amendment problem by subpoenaing the records from the bank rather than from
the individual himself.
122. Justices Stewart and Marshall each filed a dissent. Justice Brennan joined each one.
123. 442 U.S. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

1256

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 81:1229

nal activity. The prospect of unregulated governmental monitoring
will undoubtedly prove disturbing even to those with nothing illicit to
hide. Many individuals, including members of unpopular political organizations or journalists with confidential sources, may legitimately
wish to avoid disclosure of their personal contacts. 124

Perhaps the reason that views such as these 125 are not taken seriously is the nature of the cases; White involved a drug peddler, while
Smith involved a robber who continued to harass his victim by
threatening and obscene phone calls. Furthermore, the police may
have had probable cause to believe that Smith was making the
phone call. 126 Consequently, the Court may have viewed the danger
to the innocent as irrelevant to the case before it. Yet so long as
fourth amendment standards are forged in cases involving not very
nice people, the Court must be concerned about the negative impact
its decisions have on those of us who are nice. 127
124. 442 U.S. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125. The dissents of Justices Stewart and Marshall in Smith echo the dissenting opinion of
Justice Harlan in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). In White, Harlan emphasized
that a rule requiring a warrant for electronic surveillance would be aimed at protecting the
innocent, not the guilty:
By casting its "risk analysis" solely in terms of the expectation and risks that "wrongdoers" or "one contemplating illegal activities" ought to bear, the plurality opinion, I think,
misses the mark entirely. On Lee does not simply mandate that criminals must daily run
the risk of unknown eavesdroppers prying into their private affairs; it subjects each and
every law-abiding member of society to that risk. . . . Abolition of On Lee would not end
electronic eavesdropping. It would prevent public officials from engaging in that practice
unless they first had probable cause . . . and had tested their version of the facts before a
detached judicial officer. The interest On Lee fails to protect is the expectation of the
ordinary citizen, who has never engaged in illegal conduct in his life, that he may carry on
his private discourse freely, openly, and spontaneously without measuring his every word
against the connotations it might carry when instantaneously heard by others unknown to
him and unfamiliar with his situation or analyzed in a cold, formal record played days,
months, or years after the conversation. Interposition of a warrant requirement is
designed not to shield "wrongdoers," but to secure a measure of privacy and a sense of
personal security through our society.
401 U.S. at 789-90. (In On Lee v. United Stales, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), decided under trespass
doctrine, the Court held that the fourth amendment was inapplicable where an informer that
was "bugged" transmitted a conversation with a suspect to an agent who subsequently testified
to statements made.) For one example of uncontrolled clandestine surveillance, see D. GAR•
ROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (1981).
126. The Court stated the facts as follows:
On March 5, 1976, in Baltimore, Md., Patricia McDonough was robbed. She gave the
police a description of the robber and of a 1975 Monte Carlo automobile she had observed near the scene of the crime. After the robbery, McDonough began receiving
threatening and obscene phone calls from a man identifying himself as the robber. On
one occasion, the caller asked that she step out on her front porch; she did so, and saw the
1975 Monte Carlo she had earlier described to police moving slowly past her home. On
March 16, police spotted a man who met McDonough's description dnving a 1975 Monte
Carlo in her neighborhood. By tracing the license plate number, police learned that the
car was registered in the name of the petitioner, Michael Lee Smith.
442 U.S. at 737(citations omitted). On the basis of these facts, police had the telephone company install a pen register to monitor Smith's home phone.
127. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950),
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CONSENT AND THE INNOCENT PERSON

Consent searches are another area in which analysis has been directed principally to the impact on the guilty rather than the innocent. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 128 the issue was whether a valid
consent presupposed that the searchee had knowledge of the right to
withhold consent. In holding that such knowledge was not required,
the Court obviously was concerned with the impact of such a rule on
the guilty: "Any defendant who was the subject of a search authorized solely by his consent could effectively frustrate the introduction
into evidence of the fruits of that search by simply failing to testify
that he in fact knew he could refuse to consent." 129
In Bustamonte, six men were driving down the highway with a
burned-out headlight and license plate light at 1:30 a.m. A policeman stopped the car, and after only one of the six occupants produced identification, asked all six to leave the car. Subsequently two
reinforcements arrived. Only then did the policemen "ask" for and
receive permission to search the car.
Let us hypothesize innocent people (disregarding traffic violations) in this situation. Six people have been stopped, asked (ordered?) to leave the car, seen two reinforcement police cars arrive,
and then "asked" if the police may search their car. Surely, most
people in that situation would believe that not allowing the search
would create more problems than allowing it, assuming (which is not
likely) that they even believe they have a choice. Yet the search may
tum out to be destructive, 130 time-consuming, or both. The real
recognized the danger of allowing constitutional doctrines to be shaped by emotional reactions
to particular unsympathetic defendants:
The old saw that hard cases make bad law has its basis in experience. But petty cases
are even more calculated to make bad law. The impact of a sordid little case is apt to
obscure the implication of the generalization of which the case gives rise. . . . It is a fair
summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequently been forged in
controversies involving not very nice people. And so, while we are concerned here with a
shabby defrauder, we must deal with his case in the context of what are really the great
themes expressed by the Fourth Amendment.
339 U.S. at 68-69 (Frankfurther, J., dissenting).
In Smith and White, the police may have had probable cause sufficient to obtain a warrant.
If the Court felt compelled to uphold the search in those cases, it would have been better to
formulate a rule allowing introduction of seized evidence where there is probable cause but no
warrant than to characterize the intrusion as not a search at all. At least, such an approach
would not validate such intrusions without probable cause. This approach would require creating another exception to the warrant requirement - an exception that would be hard to
formulate. q. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982) (warrantless search of automobile
allowed when officers had probable cause to believe contraband concealed somewhere in car).
128. 412 U.S. at 218 (1973).
129. 412 U.S. at 230. That danger arises, of course, only if one assumes it would be impracticable simply to tell the individual that he has the right to refuse.
130. In Bustamonte, the rear seat apparently was removed to search beneath it. See also
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question is the justification for saddling innocent people with that
choice.
In Bustamonte, the Court spoke of the need for consent searches:
In situations where the police have some evidence of illicit activity,
but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search authorized by a
valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable evidence. In the present case for example, while the police had
reason to stop the car for traffic violations, the State does not contend
that there was probable cause to search the vehicle or that the search
was incident to a valid arrest of any of the occupants. Yet, the search
yielded tangible evidence that served as a basis for a prosecution, and
provided some assurance that others, wholly innocent of the crime,
were not mistakenly brought to trial. 131

The implication of this rhetoric is that the the police must have a
method to legitimate a search without probable cause lest valuable
evidence be lost and innocent people wrongly accused. If we could
take this seriously, we ought to allow searches based on less than
probable cause - perhaps reasonable, or even unreasonable, suspicion could be the standard. We don't allow such searches, however,
because probable cause has been determined to be an appropriate
balance between the government's need to obtain evidence and the
innocent person's right to be free from an intrusive search. 132
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (prohibition agents destroyed rear seat cushion
and upholstery during search of automobile for illegal liquor); Martinez v. United States, 333
F.2d 405 (9th Cir. 1964) (illegal drugs found and removed from automobile air vents).
It should be noted also that an individual might not be able to withdraw his consent once it
is given, even though the search becomes destructive. See, e.g, People v. Kennard, 175 Colo.
479,488 P.2d 563 (1971) (once given, consent cannot be withdrawn); Smith v. Commonwealth,
197 Ky. 192,246 S.W. 449 (1923) (same); Note, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal qfier Miranda
v. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. Rev. 130, 157 & n.121 (1967). Cf. United States v. DeAngelo, 584
F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1978) (once defendant presented himself for boarding and subjected his briefcase to X-ray search, he could not then withdraw "consent" and terminate search by choosing
not to take flight).
Other authorities maintain that a consent to search can be revoked at any time. See, e.g.,
Masson v. Pulliam, 557 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726 (E.D.
Pa. 1975); 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 8.1 at 633-35 (1978). See also Model Code
of Prearraignment Procedure§ 240.3(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1975). Cf. United States v.
Griffin, 530 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1976) (limitations on scope of search may be made at any time).
The Supreme Court has yet to resolve this question.
131. 412 U.S. at 227-28 (footnote omitted).
132. Despite the vast number of cases that have addressed the issue of whether probable
cause to search existed, it is difficult to formulate a concrete rule to govern individual situations. As the court in United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1972) noted: "It is a
plastic concept whose existence depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case."
458 F.2d at 821 (quoting Bailey v. United States, 389 F.2d 305, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1967)). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has dealt with a number of representative situations; those cases
offer some guidance in determining whether probable cause exists.
In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), defendant was convicted of illegally
importing liquor into Oklahoma. Defendant claimed that liquor found during a search of his
car was inadmissible because the police had no probable cause to search. The Court found
probable cause based on information within the personal knowledge of the officer: (I) the
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From the perspective of the innocent, the Court in Bustamonte
noted that "a search pursuant to consent may result in considerably
less inconvenience for the subject of the search . . . ." 133 Such a
situation could occur when an individual is stopped by the police
because his vehicle meets a generalized description of a vehicle believed to contain contraband. For example, if a policeman has information that a large yellow truck is carrying one hundred pounds of
marijuana over a particular highway, he may be justified in stopping
a yellow truck and questioning its driver. 134 Assuming, however,
arresting officer had arrested defendant five months earlier for illegally transporting liquor, (2)
the officer had seen the defendant loading liquor into his car at least twice during the prior six
months, (3) at the time of the arrest and search, defendant's car appeared to be "heavily
loaded," (4) the defendant was traveling along a known bootlegging route, and (5) when pursued by the police car, defendant increased his speed and tried to outrun the officer.
In United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965), the Court held that probable cause to
obtain a search warrant may be established by hearsay evidence, provided the affiant recites
specific underlying circumstance showing the hearsay is reliable.
In Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), defendant's conviction on interstate gambling charges was overturned on grounds that the FBI's search warrant was issued without
probable cause. In Spinelli, the FBI had relied on a tip from "a confidential reliable informant" that defendant was accepting wagers by telephone in the apartment sought to be searched.
393 U.S. at 422 (appendix to opinion of the Court). The Court found that "[though] the affiant
swore that his confidant was 'reliable,' he offered the magistrate no reason in support of his
conclusion." 393 U.S. at 416.
In United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971), the Court ruled that when an informant's
tip specified that the informant had himself purchased bootleg liquor from defendant, the tip
did demonstrate a sufficient basis for the informant's knowledge. Furthermore, the tax investigator's own knowledge of defendant's background as a bootlegger, together with the fact that
the tip was a declaration against the informant's penal interest, provided sufficient reason to
think the informant was truthful. 403 U.S. at 579-80.
133. 412 U.S. at 228.
134. Under Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), a police officer must have "at least
articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not
registered, or that either the vehicle or an occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation
of law" before he may stop an individual automobile. 440 U.S. at 663. Very little has been
settled, however, as to what constitutes "reasonable suspicion." The Supreme Court has held
that "application of [a Texas Penal statute] to detain appellant and require him to identify
himself to police officers violated the fourth amendment because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe appellant was engaged or had engaged in criminal conduct."
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979). In Brown, the officer had testified that the situation
wherein defendant was walking away from another in an alley known to be frequented by
drug traffickers " 'looked suspicious,' but he was unable to point to any facts supporting that
conclusion." 443 U.S. at 52.
See also People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559, 373 N.E.2d 1218, 402 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1978):
"'(R]easonable suspicion' has been aptly defined as 'the quantum of knowledge sufficient to
induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious man under the circumstances to believe that criminal activity is at hand . . . . The requisite knowledge must be more than subjective; it should
have at least some demonstrable roots. Mere 'hunch' or 'gut reaction' will not do." In
Sohotker, the court found no reasonable suspicion when police stopped defendants' car after
the occupants had slowed down and glanced at a bar while driving in a high-crime neighborhood. q. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). In Adams, a police officer, acting on a tip
from an informant that he knew personally and who had provided information previously,
conducted a search. The Court held that when an officer makes a reasonable investigatory
stop he may conduct a limited, protective search for weapons when he has reason to believe
the suspect is armed and dangerous.
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that this information does not amount to probable cause, the policeman could not search the truck without the driver's consent. Under
these circumstances, it may well be in the driver's best interest to
consent to the search and remove the suspicion which the policeman
would otherwise have about him. Certainly there is nothing in the
fourth amendment designed to discourage citizens from aiding
police. 135
The Bustamonte rule of no notice to the searchee of his right to
refuse consent is not necessary in this situation. The truck driver
should be informed that he may or may not consent as he sees fit. If
he does not consent, he will be suspect and watched very closely. If
he does consent and no marijuana is found, he will no longer be
under suspicion. Under these circumstances, many, if not most, innocent drivers would consent. Moreover, they would not feel that
they have been bullied by the police. Those who did not consent
would simply be exercising their right to refuse to be searched even
at the cost of remaining a suspect, a right which is at the core of the
fourth amendment.13 6
A guilty person, ie., one with marijuana, almost certainly would
turn down the invitation to have his truck searched. But the police
are not powerless. They could follow him, take his license number,
and radio for more information about him through other channels.
Indeed, this might ultimately lead to probable cause, at which point
he could be stopped and searched. 137 If not, he would receive no
more benefit than the fourth amendment allows him.
One senses that the Court in Bustamonte viewed convicting Bustamente as more important than taking the fourth amendment seri135. "[I]t is no part of the policy underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to
discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of criminals."
Bustamante, 412 U.S. at 243 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,488 (1971)).
136. This search should be distinguished from the dog-sniffing discussed in Part II, stpra,
because of its potential impact on the innocent. Neither student B nor C may "refuse to be
searched even at the cost of remaining a suspect" because the sniff will reveal on{1• evidence of
crime. In contrast, the consent search of the car will reveal all of the contents of the car,
whether criminal or not.
137. For example, in the recent case of United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), police
received an informant's tip that a man called "Bandit" was selling narcotics kept in the truck
of a maroon-colored Chevrolet Malibu on Ridge Street in the District of Columbia. The informant gave a detailed description of the man involved. Police officers then drove to the
neighborhood and spotted a maroon Malibu parked at 439 Ridge Street. Before approaching
the car or looking for the driver, they radioed police headquarters and found that the car was
owned by a man who fit the description and who sometimes went by the alias "Bandit." When
the officers saw a man fitting the description drive the car away, they stopped him and
searched the car. The court held that by verifying the informant's tip via the radio call, the
police had established probable cause to stop and search the car.
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ously. 138 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in an earlier case put it
even more starkly:
While it may not be "in accord with common experience" for a
guilty person to consent to a search which, if successful, may help to
prove his guilt, it may nevertheless occur. Happily, not all criminals
are highly intelligent and use the most effective tactics in their contacts
with the police. Again happily, sometimes their contacts with the police confuse them, and they say and do things which, after deliberation,
they regret. To whatever extent stupidity or confusion on the part of
the guilty person contributes to the prompt acquisition by the police of
evidence of crime, so that the police can get back to work on the numerous cases which may remain unsolved, society is the gainer and
nobody is the loser of anything to which he is constitutionally
entitled. 139
The complete answer to this is contained in a single sentence of Escobedo v. Illinois: "If the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart

the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that system." 140 Even more significantly, the
innocent should not be placed in a position where they feel obliged
to consent so that the guilty are more likely to "voluntarily" allow
the police to find evidence.
The threat to the innocent posed by Bustamonte is mild compared to the most pernicious of its progeny, United States v. Mendenhall 141 While changing planes in Detroit, Sylvia Mendenhall, a
twenty-two-year-old black woman who matched the "drug courier
profile," 142 was stopped and questioned by Agent Anderson of the
Drug Enforcement Agency (D.E.A.). Without probable cause, 143
138. It should be noted that Bustamante attacked his state court conviction by a petition
for habeas corpus in federal district court. Four Justices would have denied the petition on the
ground that principles of finality preclude raising a fourth amendment claim via habeas
corpus. 412 U.S. at 250-75 (Powell, J., concurring) (joined by Burger, C.J., and Rehniquist, J.)
and 412 U.S. at 249 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (Justice Blackmun said he refrained from joining the concurrence of Justice Powell because it was not necessary to determine the habeas
corpus/finality issue in deciding the case.). Three years after Bustamonte, the Supreme Court
held that the legality of a search or seizure could not be raised via habeas corpus so long as the
state courts had fully and fairly adjudicated the fourth amendment claim. Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976). Thus, the Court may have allowed its view on finality or judicial economy to
influence its approach to the fourth amendment question.
139. Martinez v. United States, 333 F.2d 405,407 (9th Cir. 1964) (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Gregory, 204 F. Supp. 884, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)).
140. 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
141. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
142. The profile is "an informally compiled abstract of characteristics thought typical of
persons carrying illicit drugs." Mendenhall fit the profile in at least four respects: she (I) came
to Detroit from Los Angeles, a major source for heroin brought to Detroit; (2) was the last
person off the plane, acted nervous, and carefully scanned the whole area where the agents
stood; (3) did not have any baggage checked through to Detroit; and (4) purchased a return
ticket on a different airline. 446 U.S. at 547 n.l.
143. It is perhaps arguable that simply matching the drug courier profile might establish
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Anderson asked Mendenhall to accompany him to the D.E.A. office,
a request to which she acquiesced. While in the D.E.A. office, Anderson asked her for permission to search her handbag and her person, informing her that she could decline. After the handbag search
proved fruitless, a policewoman who ascertained that Mendenhall
consented to be searched informed her for the the first time that the
search was to be a strip search. In response to Mendenhall's protest
that she had a plane to catch, the policewoman told her that if no
narcotics were found she could catch the plane. At that point, Mendenhall unbuttoned her clothing, reached into her undergarments,
and "voluntarily" handed the heroin to the police. The Court upheld this "consent" search. 144
Let us posit an innocent person in Mendenhall's situation. A
twenty-two-year-old black woman is asked by an older white male
D.E.A. agent to accompany him to the agency office. Given that
Mendenhall, who had drugs, acquiesced, it seems unlikely that the
one without drugs would refuse to go. 145 If Mendenhall had refused,
probable cause to search or at least reasonable suspicion to stop and question an individual.
The enforcement system using courier profiles boasts impressive figures for accuracy. The
Court in Mendenhall noted that during the first eighteen months of the program in Detroit, 77
of 96 encounters uncovered controlled substances; 122 of 141 persons intercepted were arrested. 446 U.S. at 562 (Powell, J., concurring). The issue of whether this accuracy percentage
established probable cause was not raised in Mendenhall, however. Instead, the government
never contended it had probable cause to search, and each court assumed that probable cause
did not exist.
Despite its percentage accuracy, the profile does not alone establish probable cause. For
example, if it were demonstrated that eighty percent of all dormitory rooms at a certain university contained illegal drugs of some type, there ought not to be probable cause to search them
all. For a critical look at the use of drug courier profiles, see J. CHOPER. Y. KAMISAR & L.
TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPEMENTS 1979-1980, 134-35 (1981); Note,
United States v. Mendenhall: DEA Airport Search and Seizure, 16 NEW ENG, L. REV. 597
(1981). See also note 147 infta.
144. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist concluded that the initial stop for questioning in the
airport concourse did not constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment
because a "reasonable person" would have thought she was free to leave. This view was espoused notwithstanding the D.E.A. agent's testimony that she would not have been allowed to
leave had she requested to do so. Since the initial stop was not viewed as a seizure, and since
the subsequent consent to search was deemed voluntary, Justices Stewart and Rehnquist held
the seized narcotics admissible.
Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Chief Justice Burger assumed that the initial stop did constitute a seizure but held that the agents had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity: therefore the stop for routine questioning was justified. Then, because she "consented" to further
questions and a search, the evidence was admissible.
The four dissenters - Justices White, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens - thought that the
initial stop was a seizure and that there was no reasonable suspicion to justify it. In any event,
the government did not carry its burden of proving that defendant's consent to further questioning and to a search was voluntary. Therefore, the search was tainted and the seized evidence should have been excluded.
The recent case of Florida v. Royer, 51 U.S.L.W. 4293 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1983), again produced a badly splintered Court on a similar, though not identical, fact pattern.
145. See the discussion of the pressures inherent to any police-citizen encounter in J.
CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, supra note 143, at 140-41.

Protecting the Innocent

April 1983]

1263

Agent Anderson testified that he would have forcibly detained
her. 146 Once there, would the innocent person "voluntarily consent"
to the strip search? If she wanted to catch the plane, she would. Officer Anderson testified that although Mendenhall did not have to
consent to the search, he would not have released her until she
did.141
Why must innocent people be subjected to this? Justice Powell is
surely correct in noting that "[t]he jurisprudence of the Fourth
Amendment demands consideration of the public's interest in effective law enforcement as well as each person's constitutionally secured right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." 148
Just as surely, that is the function of "probable cause." 149 When the
D.E.A. agent has probable cause, he can stop and search a citizen. 150
If the citizen is innocent, his inconvenience and humiliations are part
of the price he pays for living in an ordered society. When the police
lack probable cause, the price is too high, and a properly construed
fourth amendment should forbid it.
V.

THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

One could argue that the Court's growing distaste for the exclusionary rule 151 has contributed to the results of many of the cases
criticized in this Article. When drug pushers (Mendenhall, White),
robbers (Smith), and other thieves (Bustamonte) are caught red146. 446 U.S. at 575 n.12 (White, J., dissenting).
147. 446 U.S. at 575 n.13. In United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Mich.
1976), ajfd., 556 F.2d '385 (6th Cir. 1977), the court reviewed the consent statistics for the
D.E.A. drug courier enforcement program:
Of the 77 searches in which illegal drugs were found, the agents identified 26 consent
searches. Forty-three searches were non-consensual. [The court does not explain the situation in the other eight searches.] Illegal contraband was seized in all cases in which
consent was not given and a search was made. In 15 to 25 consent searches, agents did not
uncover any contraband drugs.
409 F. Supp. at 539.
148. 446 U.S. at 565.
149. See note 132 supra.
150. Compare United States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, in which the defendant met
the drug courier profile, used an alias, had been arrested once before for possession of heroin,
and was currently renting an apartment (aside from his residence) which was under surveillance by the Detroit police for alleged narcotics traffic (probable cause), with United States v.
Hughes, (decided with Van Lewis) in which defendant "looked like" a person previously convicted of possession of four pounds of heroin, walked fast through the airport, claimed no
luggage and looked nervous, and whose driver's license and airline ticket bore different names
(no probable cause).
151. The doctrine that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution is known as the "exclusionary rule." See, e.g., Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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handed, it is difficult to applaud decisions that turn them loose.1 52
Given that these criminals are only incidental beneficiaries of a rule
designed to protect the innocent, 153 would it be wise to jettison the
exclusionary rule in favor of suits by the innocent, who are, after all,
the intended beneficiaries of the fourth amendment? Although the
solution has been suggested, 154 it would almost certainly be detrimental to the innocent.
While one is tempted to blame the exclusionary rule for cases
like White, Smith, Bustamonte, and Mendenhall, all four cases were
in fact decided on the ground that the fourth amendment was followed, not that the exclusionary rule was an inappropriate remedy
for its violation. Furthermore, innocent people would not have
been adequate plaintiffs in those cases. An innocent person whose
conversation was transmitted or whose telephone calls were recorded
by a pen register would probably never learn of the violation. 155 An
innocent person who consented to a search would be unlikely to sue
because of the same desire for noninvolvement that caused him to
consent in the first place. Furthermore, one who had consented
would be in a poor position to seek substantial damages even if the
consent did not constitute a waiver. 156
More generally, one could argue that the exclusionary rule,
which directly aids only the guilty, is a poor means of enforcing a
right designed to benefit the innocent. 157 It has been attacked as disproportionately costly, 158 inferior to other remedies, 159 and incapa152. See, e.g., Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: lf'hy Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICA•
214, 218-20 ()978).

TURE

153. See parts I & II supra.
154. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 420-24 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
155. Of course, the innocent person might learn of the violation if police used the informa-

tion extrajudicially. For example, police might use a tape of the innocent person's conversation to harass him, or to play a joke.
156. See, e.g., Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Alternatives lo tlte Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. LJ. 1361, 1388-89 (1981) (claimant must risk reprisal by police;juries
historically have sided with police). In addition, even if a jury decides in favor of the innocent
victim, damages may be so minimal as to discourage legal action by innocent persons, Con. sider a hypothetical based on the facts ofBuslamonle,see text at notes 121-139supra, Suppose
Bustamonte had been innocent, and the search of the car turned up nothing. To what would
he be entitled? Damages based on the annoyance of a squeaky back seat in the car of which he
has use, resulting from the police search under the seat? See Mertens & Wasserstrom, Tlte
Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating tlte Police and Derailing 1/1e Law,
70 GEO. LJ. 365, 407-08 (1981).
151. See, e.g., Wilkey, supra note 152, at 228.
158. E.g, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 418-20 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
159. E.g., 403 U.S. at 421-24 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); Wilkey, supra note 152, at 227-32;
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ble of enforcing an innocent person's rights. 160 None of these attacks
has enough merit to warrant discarding the rule.
An elegant, albeit inaccurate, statement of the exclusionary rule's
high cost is Judge Cardozo's oft-quoted bon mot: "the criminal is to
go free because the constable has blundered." 161 More than a decade ago, I described its inaccuracy:
When the police make an exploratory search without probable cause, it
is indeed true that under the exclusionary rule any evidence they may
find will be excluded and that the criminal will go free if there is no
other evidence. . . . If [however] the police had not "blundered" by
committing the unreasonable search, the criminal never would have
been brought to trial in the first place since there would have been no
evidence to justify it. Therefore, in these instances the criminal does
not go free because the constable had blundered, but because he would
have gone free if the constable had not blundered. 162

Even when the criminal does go free because of the constable's blunder (such as when the constable had ample probable cause but "forgot" to get a warrant), the cost is not disproportionate. Warrants are
required because of the unjustifiably high risk that a police officer
will subject an innocent person to a search. 163 If sanctions were unavailable so long as the search were fruitful, a policemen who sincerely believed his own judgment to be correct would have little
incentive to follow the fourth amendment and seek a warrant.
Indeed, far from being disproportionately costly, the exclusionary remedy is remarkably proportionate to the wrong. When the
Government has evidence of crime that it should not have under the
fourth amendment, the exclusionary rule puts the Government
where the fourth amendment says it should be - without the
evidence.
No other remedy is this proportionate. 164 Juries may not take
seriously tort or criminal remedies against offending policemen. 165
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 756-57
(1970).
160. E.g., 403 U.S. at 415-16 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Oaks, supra ·note 159, at 736-37.
161. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926).
162. Loewy, The Warren Court as Defender ofState and Federal Criminal Laws: A Reply to
Those Who Believe that the Court is Oblivious to the Needs of Law Eeforcement, 37 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1218, 1236 (1969).
163. See text at note 6 supra.
164. Criminal prosecutions of police officers who have violated the fourth amendment are
unlikely to occur, and merit little attention. See Schroeder, supra note 156, at 1396-98.
165. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 421-22 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Foote, Tort Remediesfor Police Violations ofIndividual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955); Plumb, Illegal Eeforcement of the Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 337, 385-91 (1939); Schroeder, supra note 156, at 1388-89.
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When they are taken seriously, the deterrent effect may be too great.
For example, a policeman might not wish to make any search for a
relatively minor crime, such as the theft of a child's bicycle, if he
knows that any "blunder'' will cost him a thousand dollars in damages or thirty days in jail. 166
Chief Justice Burger's suggestion of government liability with
liquidated damages for fourth amendment violations 167 allows the
Government to buy its way around the fourth amendment. For example, if the Government wants evidence of a crime badly enough,
it can decide to ransack a house for a thousand dollars. 168 From the
individual policeman's perspective, the credit he would get from
solving a murder would make it worth the demerits for an unlawful
search. Conversely, as with individual liability, the prospect of demerits for an unlawful search for a stolen bicycle may deter even
lawful searches on the assumption that the potential gains would not
be worth the risk of being wrong. None of this suggests that remedies other than the exclusionary rule should be entirely discarded,
only that these other remedies are not so proportionate as the exclusionary rule.
The exclusionary rule protects innocent people by eliminating
the incentive to search and seize unreasonably. 169 So long as a policeman knows that any evidence he obtains in violation of the
fourth amendment will not help secure a conviction he has less reason to violate the amendment and more reason to try to understand
166. Recognizing a good faith defense for damage actions to mitigate overdeterrence
would incur the same difficulties as the recognition of such a defense in the suppression context. See notes 172-175 i'!fra and accompanying text. A good faith defense to a tort suit is
appropriate, however, so long as good faith is rejected when the more proportionate exclusion•
ary rule is invoked. See note 174 i'!fra.
167. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
422-24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
168. Judge Posner finds no difficulty in allowing the government to buy its way around the
fourth amendment. As he views it, if a particular search causes one hundred dollars worth of
inconvenience ~d does ten thousand dollars worth of good, the government ought to conduct
the search and pay the damages. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sur. CT.
REV. 49, 55. Because I do not believe constitutional rights are for sale whenever the government unilaterally decides to purchase them, I cannot accept his thesis.
169. At least so long as the officer involved is seeking evidence that can be used to secure a
conviction. The rule would not work if the officer is after something else. For example, in a
Mendenhall situation, an agent who is confronted with a subject who refused lo consent may
choose to harass the suspected drug carrier by subjecting her to an illegal search. The agent
might reason that, given the unlikelihood of securing admissible evidence without the subject's
consent, it would be preferable to conduct a consentless search than to let her go. If the agent
discovered drugs pursuant to such a search, he could confiscate the contraband, thereby al
least increasing the cost of drug trafficking. Cf. the search involving Paula Hughes in United
States v. Van Lewis, 409 F. Supp. 535, 540 (E.D. Mich. 1976), '!lfd., 556 F.2d 385 (6th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011 (1978) (motion to suppress granted lo subject who refused to
consent).
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it. While there is some evidence that for various reasons the exclusionary rule does not work perfectly, 170 there is no evidence that it
does not work at all. 171 Indeed, it defies logic to believe that a policeman's willingness to search without probable cause or a warrant
(and thereby possibly subject an innocent person to an unjustifiable
intrusion of privacy) is unrelated to whether he can gain any admissible evidence from conducting the search.
It has been suggested that the exclusionary rule be limited to bad
faith violations. 172 Under this view, any intentional violation of an
already-declared right would be subject to the exclusionary rule;
other fourth amendment violations would not be. The difficulty with
adoption of this "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule, as
Wasserstrom and Mertens recently observed, is that the development
of fourth amendment law would be retarded. 173 Indeed, with the
170. E.g., Oaks, supra note 159, at 755 (there is little empirical evidence that the rule acts
as a deterrent on law enforcement aimed at prosecution; the rule creates incentive for lying by
police officers); cf. J. HIRSHEL, FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 84-86 (1979) (Hirshel surveyed
police officers, district attorneys and defense attorneys, concluding that the exclusionary rule is
an ineffective deterrent). But see Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 156, at 395 n.138 (Hirshel's data belie his conclusion).
171. See Canon, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven Thal It Doesn't Deter Police?
62 JUDICATURE 398 (1979); Critique, On the Limitations ofEmpirical Evaluations ofthe Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiollo Research and United Stales v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L.
REV. 740 (1974).
Consider United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980). The district court found, and the
reviewing courts accepted, that the government affirmatively instructed its agents to take advantage of the standing requirement by stealing the evidence while it was in the possession of a
third party in contravention of the third party's fourth amendment rights. See 447 U.S. 727,
743 (Marshall, J., dissenting). What better evidence could there be that the threat of suppression influences government conduct?
That the government instructs its officers in fourth amendment law to avoid the exclusion
of evidence is also relevant for the proposed good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The
current compulsory suppression rule penalizes police ignorance of the law; the good faith exception would reward ignorance of fourth amendment jurisprudence. The good faith exception would be well-tailored for desensitizing the police to the constitutional rules ·constraining
search and seizure.
172. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1127 (1981); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538-42 (1976) (White, J., dissenting);
Bernardi, The Exclusionary Rule: Is a Good Faith Standard Needed to Pfeserve a Liberal Interpretation ofthe Fourth Amendment?, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. SI (1980). Fortunately, the Supreme
Court has heretofore refused to take this suggestion seriously. See Taylor v. Alabama, 102 S.
Ct. 2664, 2669 (1982). Cf. note 174 iefra and accompanying text. It has however, ordered
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 436 (1982), reargued and requested the parties
to address the question whether the rule requiring the exclusion at a criminal trial at
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment (citations omitted) should to
any extent be modified, so as, for example, not to require the exclusion of evidence obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure at issue was consistent with the
Fourth Amendment.
1035 Ct. at 436. The case was reargued Mar. 1, 1983. See 51 U.S.L.W. 3643 (summary ofora
argument).
173. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 156, at 451-52, 463. See also United States v
Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 555-58 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf. note 184iefra and accompa
nying text.
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exclusionary rule available as a vehicle for developing fourth
amendment jurisprudence, it is reasonable to retain the good faith
defense in tort suits where the remedy is not so proportionate to the
wrong. 174 To the extent that totally new search and seizure rules
could not have been anticipated, the Court's retroactivity rules substantially blunt any negative impact of police reliance on the old
rules. 175 Therefore, the good faith defense is neither desirable nor
necessary in exclusionary rule cases.
Three justifications are usually given for the exclusionary rule:
(1) vindication of the personal rights of the defendant before the
court, (2) deterrence of future violations, and (3) preservation of judicial integrity. 176 In recent years, the Court has required both the
first and second justification as a predicate for the exclusionary
rule. 177 It has refused to exclude the evidence unless exclusion
would significantly deter police misconduct even though the party
174. Since the decision of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 has
become the classic civil rights statute. It reads as follows:
Every person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
In actions under this statute, a defendant's culpability should be a factor in determining
damages. It is reasonable and desirable that damages resulting from flagrant abuses of power
be paid for by those that inflicted them. But to hold the wrongdoer personally responsible
under all circumstances would render law enforcement impossible in any "borderline" situation. Few police officers would be willing to risk having to pay damages for making an arrest
which they believed in good faith to be lawful. In contrast to the exclusionary rule, an action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could result in a small claim against a police officer, or it could leave
him bankrupt, without a good faith defense to protect the individual violator who has acted in
the belief he is upholding the law. Our desire to see civil rights abusers punished would be
vindicated, but at the expense of unjustly punishing police officers.
175. A good faith defense would prohibit damages or suppression for a fourth amendment
violation, unless the facts in a case were nearly identical to a previously decided case. Otherwise, the police officer would not know that his or her action violated the fourth amendment,
Since the officer would not be liable anyway, a court would have no reason to reach the question of whether in fact the officer's actions did violate the fourth amendment. q: Ashcroft v.
Mattis, 43LU.S.,l71 (1977) (Constitutionality of law permitting a police officer to use deadly
force in effectuating an arrest was moot since even if the law were unconstitutional, the police
officer relied in good faith upon the law which theretofore had not been declared unconstitutional.); Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 156, at 430 n.348. A good faith defense to a tort
suit is appropriate, however, so long as the exclusionary rule is retained. See note 174 and
accompanying text, supra. When a new fourth amendment rule is announced, it is prospective
only. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975). When a fourth amendment decision does
not change a rule, but resolves a previously unsettled question, the decision will apply to cases
for which direct review is still pending, but not to cases which have been finally adjudicated,
See United States v. Johnson, 102 S. Ct. 2579 (1982).
176. See, e.g., Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 156, at 377-78; Kamisar, ls the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or "Unnatural" Interpretation of The Fourth Amendment?, 62 JUDI·
CATURE 66, 67 (1978); Wilkey, supra note 152, at 200.
177. Preservation of judicial integrity, if not entirely out of judicial favor, is little more
than a makeweight argument. Recent references to it generally h:ive been in dissenting opin-
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seeking exclusion was personally the victim of an unlawful search
and seizure. 178 On the other hand, it has also refused to exclude
evidence when the defendant was not personally victimized by the
unlawful search and seizure even though failure to exclude invited
more unlawful searches. 179
Since the primary purpose of the fourth amendment ought to be
protection of the innocent, the Court's principal focus should be on
the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule. 18° From this perspective, it should not matter whether the "incidental beneficiary" seeks
vindication for his personal fourth amendment rights or seeks to exclude evidence wrongfully obtained from another, perhaps innocent,
person. Thus far, only California has accepted this proposition. 181
Perhaps if the Supreme Court were to view the fourth amendment
from the perspective of the innocent, it would be more willing to
follow California. 182
Under the Supreme Court's personal-vindication rule, the Government can use evidence obtained against third persons from an
electronic eavesdropping device unlawfully installed in my house. 183
The police can search my house without a w~rrant or probable
cause, secure in the knowledge that any evidence they find against a
third party will be admissible. 184 Even if the police deliberately subject an innocent person to a search because of their knowledge that
the evidence will be admissible against their target subject, the eviions. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 355-60 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
178. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 280 (1978) (cost of excluding testimony
of a witness said to be too high when deterrent effect on police conduct was speculative and
unlikely); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348-52 (exclusionary rule may not be invoked by a grand jury witness; application of the rule to grand jury proceedings would not
"significantly further" goal of deterrence of police misconduct).
119. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (defendant's fourth amendment
rights are violated only when the challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of
privacy rather than that of a third party; respondent had no privacy interest in documents
seized from the briefcase of a bank officer); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (passengers
in car, neither drivers nor owners and having no interest in the property seized, had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or in the area underithe seat; did not
have standing to challenge a search of the car); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969)
(codefendants and coconspirators have no special standing and cannot prevent the admission
against them of information obtained through electronic surveillance that is illegal against
another codefendant or coconspirator).
180. Vindication of personal rights and judicial integrity should be viewed as incidental,
but not unimportant, functions of the excl~sionary rule.
181. See People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
182. Cf. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 120-21 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
183. Under the Alderman rule, the governmept could use information against a third person in this hypothetical, assuming the third pers?f were not a party to the conversation being
monitored. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.\165 (1969).
184. See, e.g., United States v. Salvucci, 448 6.S. 83 (1980).
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dence will not be excluded. 185
From the perspective of the innocent, this rule is positively perverse. Assume that the police suspect that X has either hidden a gun
in his home or in rs home. If the police search X's home without a
warrant, they know that the gun will be inadmissible. But they can
search rs home without a warrant, secure in the knowledge that if
they find the gun it will be admissible against X 186 In the above
situation, if the police had probable cause to believe that X's gun was
hidden either in X's house or rs house, they probably could not get
a warrant to search either house because of their inability to specify
in which house irwas. 187 The Supreme Court's rule allows them to
resolve the dilemma by searching innocent rs house first. If they
find the gun, it is admissible against X,· if they don't, they now have
probable cause and can get a warrant to search X's house. Adoption
of the California rule would prevent this perversity. 188
The Supreme Court's current trend has increased the opportunity
for police to prey on the innocent. For example, prior to 1980 in the
above hypothetical, if X owned the gun, he could object to its unlawful seizure from rs house 189 because as the owner of the property
seized, he was a personal victim of the fourth amendment violation.190 In 1980, the Court in Rawlings v. Kentucky 191 held that an
185. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
186. X's ownership of the gun probably would not give him standing. See Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
187. There is little case law defining the fourth amendment's warrant criterion of "particularly describing the place to be searched." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Where police seek to
search two or more different places not owned or occupied by the same individual, one, court
has said that separate warrants would be required. See Williams v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 131,
134, 240 P.2d 1132, I 137 (1952). It would seem that in such a case, probable cause for issuance
of separate warrants would not exist unless the information possessed by the police singled out
the place to be searched. Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 480-81 (1963) (arrest of
an individual not lawful where there was no showing by police that they had information
narrowing the scope of their search to that particular person); Mallory v. United States, 354
U.S. 449, 456 (1957) (police may not make "at large" arrests of several subjects and use the
interrogating process to determine for which subject they have "probable cause" to arrest).
188. Even from the perspective of the guilty, tlte rule requiring personal injury does not
work well. The current rule is not related to any standard of guilt. Let us vary the hypothetical in the text by assuming that Y is the ringleader in a conspiracy and X is a coconspirator. If
the police illegally search rs house and seize the conspiracy plans which implicate X, then X
can be successfully prosecuted. Y, however, can successfully challenge the illegal search and
evade conviction. X goes to jail while Y, the big boss, is free to plan another spree. See Kelley
v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1932); Bilodeau v. United States, 14 F.2d 582, 585 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 737 (1926).
189. X could not, however, object to Y turning in the gun to the police. See Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 484-90 (1971). Nor could X object to Y consenting to a search.
See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-72 (1974).
190. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
191. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
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owner of narcotics could not challenge their seizure pursuant to an
unlawful search of a companion's purse. The Court reasoned that
because Rawlings had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
companion's purse, his ownership of the seized property was insufficient to allow him to challenge the constitutionality of the search.
Obviously, Rawlings encourages more speculative searches since evidence not owned by the victim of the search will be admissible, even
when the owner and victim are sitting side by side (as they were in
Rawlings).
Rawlings was foreshadowed by the unfortunate case of Rakas v.
Illinois, 192 in which the Court held that passengers in an automobile
who were stopped, searched, ordered out of the car at gunpoint, 193
and deprived of transportation during the unconstitutional search of
the automobile 194 were not persons aggrieved by the unlawful
search. The message to police is simple: "Stop any car you wish
with multiple occupants. Any evidence that you find will be admissible against all but the owner or driver." 195 Had Rakas been the
law when Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 196 was decided, none of the
analysis of that case would have been necessary. Bustamonte would
have had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the car and the
search would not have been unlawful as to him.
Hostility toward the exclusionary rule no doubt motivated the
Court in Rakas. It said: "Each time the exclusionary rule is applied
it exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of fourth amendment rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from the trier of
fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected." 197 The decision,
however, altered the right, not merely the remedy. An innocent per192. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
193. Appendix at 18, Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
194. Since Rakas was denied standing, the constitutionality of the search was never determined. However, it is difficult to conceive that the police had probable cause to search the car
under the facts in Rakas: police were looking for a 1970 blue Plymouth Roadrunner used as a
getaway car after the robbery. The car was described as having a white racing stripe and
damage to the front. The license was said to be SA, numbers unknown. The fleeing robbers
were described as two white males, one wearing a blue shirt and dark jacket. Police stopped
and searched at gunpoint a 1970 purple Roadrunner with no stripe or damage to the front.
The car's license plate was RT-6237. The car had four occupants in it, two men and two
women. One of the men was wearing a blue shirt. Just before the car was stopped, it was
described as traveling at an unusually slow pace. See Appendix at 4-24, Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978). However, before the car was stopped, the real getaway car had already been
recovered. Brief for Petitioners at 6, id. Assuming that one could stretch to view these facts as
giving rise to a reasonable suspicion sufficient to allow the police to stop the vehicle, it is
unimaginable that the police had probable cause for their gunpoint search.
195. It is not clear whether a nonowner driver has standing, since the defendants in Rakas
were neither owners nor drivers.
·
196. 412 U.S. 218 (1973); see text at notes 128-140 supra.
197. 439 U.S. at 137.
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son in Rakas' position would have no cause of action against the
officer for any of the indignities to which he was subjected other than
the search of his person. He could not sue for the inconvenience of
the stop, the forced exit, or the time consumed during the search of
the automobile. 198 Such is the unfortunate byproduct of treating the
fourth amendment from the perspective of the guilty rather than the
innocent.
CONCLUSION

The fourth amendment is designed to protect innocent people,
ie., people who have not committed a crime or who do not possess
sought-after evidence. Criminals or those who possess evidence of
crime are allowed to object to the manner in which such evidence
was obtained only because the search or seizure may have created an
unjustifiably high risk of an intrusion upon an innocent person's privacy. Therefore, devices such as marijuana-sniffing dogs which can
only detect contraband and do not intrude upon the innocent ought
to be allowed regardless of probable cause or a warrant. 199 Many
substantive fourth amendment decisions, particularly those dealing
with expectations of privacy200 and consent,201 have focused on the
rights of the guilty to such an extent that their impact on the innocent has been lost. Finally, the Court has failed to recognize the
value of the exclusionary rule as a device for protecting the innocent.
Consequently the rule has been restricted so much that it fails to
offer innocent citizens the protection to which they should be entitled
under the fourth amendment. 2 0 2
Unless the Court frankly recognizes that fourth amendment protections are for the innocent, it is unlikely that the problems identified in this Article will be rectified.
198. In his concurring opinion in Rakas, Justice Powell states: "The petitioners do not
challenge the constitutionality of the police action in stopping the automobile in which they
were riding; nor do they complain of being made to get out of the vehicle," 439 U.S. at 150-51.
Justice Powell's attempt to construe the issue narrowly as being whether the search after the
petitioners had left the car violated their fourth amendment rights is not responsive to their
argument.
The petitioners' brief to the Supreme Court stated that they sought "an order which would
require the state court to decide the ultimate question of whether the search was lawful." Brief
for Petitioners at 8, id. The petitioners originally challenged the search of the car in which
they were passengers in a suppression hearing in the 11linois state court system. In their motion to suppress, petitioners challenged the search on a number of grounds, among which were
that police lacked probable cause to stop the car, that the passengers were ordered out of the
car at gunpoint and that the subsequent search was not made incident to any lawful arrest.
Appendix at 5, id.
199. See Part II supra.
200. See Part III supra.
201. See Part IV supra.
202. See Part V supra.

